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Abstract
Judicial opinions typically rely on facts about a social group to justify or reject
limitations on group members’ rights, especially when traditional views about
the status or capacity of group members are in contest. Yet the fact based ap-
proach to decision making obscures the normative judgments that actually deter-
mine whether restrictions on individual rights are reasonable. This article offers
an account of how and why courts intervene in social conflicts by focusing on
facts rather than declaring norms. In part, it argues that this approach preserves
judicial flexibility to retain traditional justifications for restricting group members’
rights in some settings but not others without having to explain the inconsistent
treatment of group related norms. The consequences of the fact based decision
making fiction appear strikingly in many contemporary same sex marriage cases,
where courts treat procreative facts as decisive and avoid reconciling gay couples’
exclusion from marriage with other decisions that treat sexual orientation-based
differences as legally insignificant. In that light, the article tests the costs and ben-
efits of greater candor regarding the normative underpinnings of decisions.
The article also challenges the claim that courts can and should remain neutral in
public debates by sustaining traditional norms when views about social groups are
in contest. It argues that this position, like the judicial embrace of fact-based de-
cision making, rests on the same flawed premise that restrictions on social groups
can be evaluated based on facts alone. Our theories of judicial review will be
better off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the
extent they recognize the inevitable involvement of courts in making normative
judgments about social groups.
1Constitutional Tipping Points:   
Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication  
 
By Suzanne B. Goldberg1
Judicial opinions typically rely on “facts” about a social group to justify or reject limitations on 
group members’ rights, especially when traditional views about the status or capacity of group 
members are in contest. Yet the fact-based approach to decision-making obscures the normative 
judgments that actually determine whether restrictions on individual rights are reasonable. This 
article offers an account of how and why courts intervene in social conflicts by focusing on facts 
rather than declaring norms. In part, it argues that this approach preserves judicial flexibility to 
retain traditional justifications for restricting group members’ rights in some settings but not others 
without having to explain the inconsistent treatment of group-related norms. The consequences of 
the fact-based decision-making fiction appear strikingly in many contemporary same-sex marriage 
cases, where courts treat procreative facts as decisive and avoid reconciling gay couples’ exclusion 
from marriage with other decisions that treat sexual orientation-based differences as legally 
insignificant. In that light, the article tests the costs and benefits of greater candor regarding the 
normative underpinnings of decisions.  
The article also challenges the claim that courts can and should remain neutral in public debates by 
sustaining traditional norms when views about social groups are in contest. It argues that this 
position, like the judicial embrace of fact-based decision-making, rests on the same flawed 
premise that restrictions on social groups can be evaluated based on facts alone. Our theories of 
judicial review will be better off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to 
the extent they recognize the inevitable involvement of courts in making normative judgments 
about social groups. 
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Courts . . . do not sit or act in a social vacuum. . . . . [W]hat once was a “natural” and 
“self-evident” ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on 
human potential and freedom.2
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between 
male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our 
history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white.3
I.  Introduction 
 
How do we measure tipping points in constitutional litigation?  More specifically, 
how do courts decide whether traditionally accepted views of social groups have 
transformed, as a result of societal change, into impermissible justifications for restricting 
group members’ rights?4 In addressing these questions, this article has two aims:  The 
 
2 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
3 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4 By social groups, I simply mean clusters of individuals that are treated by the surrounding community as 
comprising an independently identifiable group based on a shared characteristic or practice.  The 
“particular social group” category in asylum law, which is one of five grounds on which individuals who 
have a well-founded fear of persecution can seek asylum, helps illuminate the social group concept as I use 
it here.  See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (describing particular social group 
membership as defined by a shared characteristic “that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences”), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).   
While the definition of social group might be construed more broadly to encompass groups linked 
by occupation (e.g., lawyers, opticians, pushcart vendors) or other interests as much as groups linked by 
traits that are arguably more deeply rooted, my focus here is on groups that are conventionally viewed as 
making civil rights-based claims and as having the sort of connection identified in Matter of Acosta. These 
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3first is to advance our understanding of how courts intervene in conflicts regarding 
popular views of social groups.  The second is to challenge the widely held view that 
courts can and should minimize the invasiveness of judicial intervention by sustaining the 
status quo when views about social groups are in contest.   
 The current wave of litigation by gay and lesbian couples seeking to marry 
prompts the inquiry here, as these cases saliently illustrate the tensions associated with 
adjudicating challenges to longstanding norms regarding social groups.  At this moment, 
judges around the United States are deciding whether the rationales traditionally accepted 
to justify excluding gay couples from marriage should now be understood, in light of 
changing social views, to reflect impermissible hostility rather than legitimate 
government interests.  Some have found it “eminently rational for the Legislature to 
postpone making fundamental changes to [the different-sex couple requirement for 
marriage] until such time as there is unanimous scientific evidence, or popular consensus, 
or both, that such changes can safely be made.”5 Others, by contrast, have concluded that 
prohibiting gay couples from marrying “cannot plausibly further” a state’s aim of 
 
groups include people of color, women, people with mental retardation, and lesbians and gay men, among 
others.  Cf. Robert Cover, Origin of Judicial Activism, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1299 (1982) (describing a 
common conceptualization of minorities as groups “deemed to have a common element of dominating 
significance, observable in social structure and social process as they affect politics”).  Still, the positive 
and normative accounts set out below likely also would have relevance to adjudication of constitutional 
claims brought by groups affiliated by “some common impulse or interest.”  See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 
801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (characterizing a particular social group as “a collection of people 
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest”). 
 For discussion of the relationship of social groups to social movements, see Tomiko Brown-
Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law:  The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 
1488-1527 (2005).  For social science perspectives on the concept of social group, see, e.g., STEREOTYPES 
AS EXPLANATIONS: THE FORMATION OF MEANINGFUL BELIEFS ABOUT SOCIAL GROUPS (Craig McGarty et 
al. eds., 2002). 
5 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting); see also 
Samuels v. New York State Dept. of Health, 2006 WL 346465, at **6-7 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006); 
Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 360-61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 
A.2d 259, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
4“ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing” in light of changing demographics and 
laws recognizing that “people in same-sex couples may be ‘excellent’ parents.”6
A similar pattern exists in federal civil rights litigation where claims are made that 
once-acceptable views regarding sex, race, and other characteristics have become 
destabilized as a consequence of societal change.  In these cases, parallel questions arise 
regarding whether the traditional justifications remain legitimate bases for different 
treatment.   
 Yet even if we assume that courts stay roughly within the parameters of 
acceptable change set by the broader society,7 we are left to wonder how courts 
assimilate changing views about social groups and simultaneously avoid being perceived 
as unduly usurping the legislature’s prerogative to reflect the people’s will.8 While this 
 
6 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-63 (majority opinion); see also Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005), rev’d 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005); Hernandez, 805 
N.Y.S.2d  at 389-90 (Saxe, J.P., dissenting); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289-90 (Collester, J., dissenting).  One 
other court, the Vermont Supreme Court, sought to temper its rejection of the traditional exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage by authorizing the legislature to remedy the state constitutional violation.  See 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).  The Legislature ultimately adopted a civil union statute that 
provided parity of rights and benefits within Vermont for gay and non-gay couples.  See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1201 (2000).  For a defense of this type of balancing approach, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:  Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004). 
7 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606 
(“[J]udicial decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a majority of the people,”); Robert C. Post, The 
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”).  See 
also Steven  G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr. Dooley’s 
dictum about the Supreme Court’s tendency to follow the election returns seems no less apt today than 
when it was first printed almost a century ago.”).  Although the received wisdom may be acknowledged 
broadly, the question whether the dialectic relationship between courts and society is desirable remains 
contentious, especially in originalist quarters.  See generally SCOTT D. BERGER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999) (describing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as aiming to 
discern and apply the framers’ original principles). 
8 One could argue that the operative category here is better characterized not as social groups but as issues 
or conduct.  After all, the perceived link among group members may be common conduct or shared 
sensibilities or capacities that differentiate group members from others.  Further, normative judgments 
about group members tend to inform normative judgments about members’ conduct and capacity and vice 
versa.  Thus, the distinction between popular views about a group and views about issues or conduct related 
to that group is often fuzzy, at best.  The dominant tradition of regulating conduct as a means of regulating 
group members exacerbates this lack of clarity.  Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) 
(recognizing that Texas’s regulation of “homosexual conduct” impacted the rights of lesbians and gay 
men).  Indeed, a significant line of equal protection jurisprudence is occupied with the question whether 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art34
5concern is a perennial one for courts, the relative finality of constitutional adjudication 
heightens it in ways that statutory interpretation and common law adjudication do not.9
The existing scholarship on judicial review goes a step further than the received 
wisdom regarding the close relationship between judicial analysis and prevailing social 
views by not only recognizing the tension embedded in the judicial role in these kinds of 
cases but also advancing normative arguments for its mitigation.  Popular 
constitutionalists, who reject judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation, 
contend that courts lack both the accountability and competence to constitutionalize 
determinations about contested social issues such as the exclusion of gay couples from 
 
regulation that is arguably conduct-based actually reflects impermissible sentiment regarding a social 
group.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  Because group members bear the brunt of regulation—whether the 
regulation explicitly targets conduct or a trait, I find the social group category most useful for getting at the 
process by which courts absorb social change related to subpopulations and the issues affiliated with them.  
Admittedly, the fit is not perfect.  I flag below places where the risk of slippage is greatest and where a 
focus on issues rather than groups might be the better analytic lens.  
 More broadly, the focus here on change involving social groups and related issues is but one 
dimension of a larger conversation about the relationship between courts and societal change.  The 
common law, for example, has long embodied the expectation that courts will take account of change in 
developing legal principles.  See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933) (“[T]he common law is 
not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”); see also GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3-4 (1982) (describing common law courts as the 
“principal instruments” for “balanc[ing] the need for continuity and change”).  Likewise, strong arguments 
have been advanced that courts should take societal change into account in statutory interpretation.  See, 
e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).   
 The claims here likely have some application to adjudication in non-constitutional settings as well 
as to constitutional adjudication involving changes to attitudes, practices, and technology that are not 
related directly to social groups.  Certainly, the concept of fact-based adjudication developed here seems to 
carry over to other areas.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862-64 (1992) (discussing the 
reliance on shifting conceptions of fact during and after the Lochner era).   See also Alafair S. Burke, Lee:  
Murder and the Reasonable Man:  Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 
1048, 1052-53 (2005) (discussing the ways in which empirical observations are shaped by normative views 
of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).   
9 See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 4 (“The incremental nature of common law adjudication means 
that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so over time and 
in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the 
Dawn of a New Century:  Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
16 (1995) (“There is of course a ‘critical difference’ between when courts make constitutional law and 
when they make common law.  Outside the area of constitutional adjudication, state court decisions ‘are 
subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute.  The court is standing in for the legislature, and if it has 
done so in a way the legislature does not approve, it can soon be corrected.’  But when a case is decided on 
constitutional grounds, the court solidifies the law in ways that may not be as susceptible to subsequent 
modification either by courts or by legislatures.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).    
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6marriage.10 Others argue that, rather than categorical judicial restraint, the common law 
approach of “rational traditionalism,” can and should guide judicial review.11 This 
approach, as articulated by David Strauss, would require courts to “think twice about . . . 
judgments of right and wrong when they are inconsistent with what has gone before” and 
move incrementally, in most instances, rather than breaking sharply with longstanding 
traditions.12 Robert Post has offered still another approach, invoking Louis Brandeis to 
suggest the centrality of “practical tact and judgment” to preserve legal authority.13 
Even these arguments, however, offer only general observations about and 
recommendations for judicial decision-making when the surrounding societal terrain is in 
contest.  This article aims to provide a more rigorous, specific account of the process by 
which courts “tip” from one understanding of a social group and its constitutional claims 
to another by unearthing and critiquing the structural features of adjudication where 
views regarding social groups are, or have been, in flux.   
The core claim made here is that while courts14 are very much engaged in 
absorbing, evaluating, and responding to changes in popular norms regarding social 
groups,15 they proceed in their decision-making by focusing on facts about group 
 
10 See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); 
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional 
Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557 (2002). 
11 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
12 Id. at 896-97.  Strauss adds that rejection of tradition is justified when, “on reflection, we are sufficiently 
confident that we are right, and . . . the stakes are high enough.”  Id. at 897. 
13 Post, supra note 7, at 109. 
14 Although the discussion below focuses heavily on U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, much of the 
analysis and some of the discussion apply to state courts and lower federal courts as well. 
15 This analysis rests on the belief that constitutional adjudication involves a “gradual process of judicial 
inclusion and exclusion.”  Davidson v. Louisiana, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).  The decisions below 
demonstrate this evolutionary theory’s descriptive validity and set the foundation for my scrutiny of how 
social groups fit within the evolutionary process.  A normative defense of constitution adjudication as an 
evolving process rather than as fixed and determined exclusively by text and/or history is beyond the scope 
here.   
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7members and leaving normative judgments about group members unmentioned.16 
Through this process, which I term fact-based adjudication, courts cite “new” or “newly 
understood” facts as the reason for revising the constitutional rights of group members.  
Alternately, they reject arguments to change the status quo by opining that facts either 
have not changed or have not changed sufficiently to warrant a new constitutional 
analysis.  Yet, typically, they do not acknowledge the normative judgments about group 
members that shape both their factual perceptions and legal reasoning, particularly where 
popular views about a social group are contested.  Only after an initial foray (or series of 
forays) through fact-based cases do courts acknowledge the normative judgments about 
group members that were implicit in earlier decisions.  This adjudicative method has a 
variety of consequences for judicial review of social change-based claims – both positive 
and negative – that I explore below.   
Numerous cases illustrate the operation of this fact-based approach to 
adjudication involving social groups.  Consider, for example, the Court’s determination 
that “modern knowledge” of race discrimination’s harmful effects required invalidation 
of school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education.17 Although Brown is widely 
treated as having established the normative impermissibility of racial segregation, the 
Court’s opinion did not actually discuss, much less condemn, societal norms regarding 
the inferiority of African Americans that had previously justified race-based distinctions 
in education.  The Court’s recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger18 also highlights the 
 
16 As will be explained shortly, see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text, the distinction between fact 
and norm is drawn here for heuristic purposes rather than to suggest a fundamental difference between the 
two. 
17 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  See infra text accompanying notes 86-91. 
18 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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8judicial inclination toward fact-based analysis when social norms are in contest.19 There, 
the normative value of affirmative action as a remedy for past racial discrimination 
remained unmentioned.  Instead, the Court relied on the factual benefits of diversity to 
justify the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in admissions.20 
Judicial approaches to sex equality in the early 1970s likewise were framed in 
terms of “new” or changed facts requiring a break with the past normative view that 
women were less capable in the public sphere than men.  Yet even as facts about the 
capacity of women relative to men were treated as decisive,21 the decisions 
unquestionably forged new normative ground.   
Romer v. Evans, which invalidated a Colorado amendment barring 
antidiscrimination protections for gay people, also was cast as a fact-driven decision.22 
While affirming the general constitutional norm that government may not act based on 
animus toward unpopular groups, the Court refused to address the normative judgment 
specific to gay people – “moral disapproval of homosexuality” – that the dissent 
proffered to show the reasonableness of Colorado’s restriction.  Instead, the majority 
pinned its holding on the lack of factual connection between Colorado’s ban and the 
government’s alleged interests in protecting associational freedom and scarce 
governmental resources.23 
19 Affirmative action arguably is better characterized as implicating popular views of an issue rather than a 
social group.  See supra note 7.  But see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness From 
the Original Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009 (2004) (discussing ways in which views of race shape views 
of affirmative action). 
20 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33.  See infra text accompanying notes 100-104. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 105-108. 
22 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996).   
23 Id.  Admittedly, the Court not only disregarded norms specific to gay people but also left factual 
perceptions of gay people largely unmentioned, hinging its decision instead on more generic facts 
concerning the lack of fit between a ban on antidiscrimination laws and the government’s interests in 
preserving associational freedom and safeguarding scarce resources.  See infra text accompanying notes 
54-57, 109-112.  Still, because it applied a general antidiscrimination norm to a specific social group 
without ever acknowledging the normative judgments regarding the social group that were implicit in its 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art34
9While this fact-based decision-making strategy has many appeals, which will be 
developed below, its theoretical foundations are shaky, at best.  After all, facts alone do 
not supply the judgment necessary to decide whether a legal burden on a social group is 
reasonable.  As David Hume famously put the point, an “ought” cannot be derived from 
an “is.”24 The fact that women tend to have primary childcare responsibilities, for 
example, does not itself determine whether a law that distinguishes between men and 
women is reasonable.  Instead, courts charged with evaluating sex-based restrictions must 
make normative judgments about the relevance of gendered childcare roles or other 
(purported) factual differences between men and women.  The same is true for evaluation 
of restrictions on other social groups.  That courts focus on facts and leave normative 
judgments unmentioned obscures but does not eliminate the influence of social norms on 
both analysis and outcomes.25 
The pervasiveness of fact-based adjudication, with its fictional premise and its 
related obfuscation of normative judgments about group members,26 prompts several 
questions about the ways in which courts react to constitutional claims by social groups.  
What, exactly, is the relationship between facts and norms regarding social group 
members in constitutional adjudication?  Why does a fact-based approach to adjudication 
dominate where norms about social groups are in contest?  What can we learn from it 
 
opinion, Romer reinforces the judicial preference for avoiding articulation of norms related to social groups 
when those norms are in contest.  
24 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Book III, Part I, Section I) (L.A. Selby-Bigge & 
P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (1739). 
25 This form of reasoning from fact directly to judgment, without analysis of the norms at issue, allows for 
incompletely theorized decisions as well as the operation of inchoate, unconscious, or ill-formulated norms, 
as will be discussed infra. For extended discussion of undertheorized decisions, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).    
26 This is not to suggest that courts avoid articulating norms altogether.  In any constitutional challenge to a 
restriction on individual rights, a norm that government action be reasonable or non-arbitrary, at least, is 
always stated.  Instead, my interest is in how courts assess whether restrictions on social groups violate 
these general norms.  My contention is, again, that while these determinations requires judgment about the 
social group in question, courts regularly hold out facts about the group as determinative of the restriction’s 
reasonableness and leave the judgments about the group unspoken.   
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about the factors that influence judicial responses to constitutional adjudication regarding 
social group members?  What does this approach suggest for advocates and courts 
enmeshed in social change litigation?  And, finally, what would be the benefits, and 
costs, of displacing fact-based adjudication with a commitment to judicial candor 
regarding the social group-related norms underlying decisions?   
The remainder of this article will explore these questions in the context of 
constitutional adjudication where popular views about the status and capacity of social 
group members are contested.  Before sketching the article’s claims regarding each of 
these questions, a preliminary caveat is in order.  While separating facts from norms is 
useful heuristically for purposes of identifying a significant judicial decision-making 
dynamic,27 the distinction should not be overstated.  Facts, as well as norms, are 
inevitably theory soaked and socially constructed.28 Like the difference between law and 
fact, the distinction between norms and facts “does not imply the existence of static, polar 
opposites.  Rather, [norms and facts] have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and 
relative stability on a continuum of experience.”29 Put another way, “because the 
positions people take reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews, disputes over [facts] 
 
27 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) (“In our legal 
system, the categories [of law and fact] have functioned as crucially important constructs that permit us to 
understand, organize, and regulate certain forms of social experience.”).  For useful and fascinating 
accounts of the concept of fact, see MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS OF 
KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998) and BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF 
FACT: ENGLAND, 1550-1720 (2000). 
 Jurgen Habermas has explored a different dimension of the relationship between fact and norm at 
length as it relates to the status and legitimacy of law.  See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND 
NORM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
28 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:  The Disaggregation of Sex 
From Gender, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (making this point with respect to the treatment of sex as fact 
and gender as norm); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist 
Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 650-53 (2002) (discussing the occasional recognition by courts of 
the socially constructed nature of facts).    
29 Monaghan, supra note 27, at 233. 
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are in essence ‘the product of an ongoing debate about the ideal society.’”30 Yet while 
the two are inevitably interrelated, courts invest a great deal of significance in the 
perceived boundary between them.  Through interrogating the judicial reification of this 
boundary, we can begin to demystify and critique the process by which courts absorb 
change in the surrounding society.   
In Part II, I lay the groundwork for this analysis by mapping the fact-based 
approach to adjudication of constitutional claims by social group members.  Part III 
elaborates the operation of fact-based adjudication in contested normative arenas.  The 
discussion first explores the judicial inclination to focus on “new” facts about the social 
group at issue while leaving normative underpinnings of decisions unacknowledged.  I 
then show how fact-based decisions accrete to form the foundation for later cases in 
which norm shifts are acknowledged openly.  Against this background, Part IV considers 
the role of social science and social movements within the fact-based adjudication model. 
Part V takes up the theoretical inquiry into why courts tend to respond societal 
change by focusing on facts rather than on shifting normative judgments about group 
members.  While legal process, legal realist, and socio-psychological frames each lend 
important insights, I argue that fact-based adjudication also must be understood as 
serving judges’ institutional interests by minimizing constraints on future decision 
making.  By avoiding identification of underlying norms concerning group members, 
courts issuing fact-based opinions retain freedom to engage with future cases on factual 
grounds and reduce the likelihood that stare decisis principles will require the norm 
 
30 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 
154 (2006) (citation omitted).  Yet, as Kahan and Braman have also observed, “[i]nstead of challenging one 
another’s worldviews, those who continue the debate simply challenge one another’s honesty and 
integrity.”  Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural Theory of Gun-
Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1321 (2003).  Within this article’s frame, their point reinforces 
the argument here that normative conflicts play out in empirical debates.    
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reflected in earlier decisions to be carried over into the new case.  The risk of normative 
overcommitment, in other words, is eliminated or substantially diminished.31 For 
example, the early women’s rights cases recognized women’s equality to men by 
reference to women’s experience with estate administration32 or facts related to women’s 
workforce participation33 but did not announce a norm of sex equality, thereby preserving 
room for the Court to test and refine its commitment to sex equality over time.   
Part VI evaluates the benefits and costs that would flow from greater judicial 
candor regarding the normative judgments about social groups that are inevitably 
embedded in constitutional adjudication.  While recognizing numerous advantages to 
greater candor, I conclude that full exposure of underlying norms would not necessarily 
be desirable as a general rule, even if it were possible.  So long as decisions are fact-
centered and uncommitted to particular normative judgments regarding the significance 
of those social group facts, room remains for legislatures to move incrementally and for 
extrajudicial sources, including social science and social movements, to heighten their 
influence on social norms as well as on perceptions of fact.     
At the same time, however, unqualified acceptance of the fiction that facts alone 
can account for decisions to sustain or reject challenges to restrictions on group 
members’ rights has serious costs.  Absent pressure to acknowledge the normative 
judgments inherent in judicial opinions, courts remain free to avoid explaining the 
continued force of negative norms about a social group in some contexts but not others.  
For example, without free reign for fact-based decision-making, courts adjudicating 
marriage cases could not proceed as though they were in uncharted territory when 
 
31 While normative overcommitment can also be avoided by establishing narrow norms, the discussion 
below illustrates the relative difficulty of doing so.  See infra text accompanying notes 200-202.  Even 
narrowed norms require a level of explicitly normative defense that fact-based decisions avoid. 
32 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also infra text accompanying notes 105-108. 
33 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); see also infra note 117. 
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considering whether differences between same- and different-sex couples justify 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage.  While greater candor would not compel 
particular outcomes in these cases, it would require acknowledgment and distinction of 
the many instances in which differences between gay and non-gay people are not treated 
as relevant in related contexts, such as custody, visitation, and second-parent adoption.   
Stepping back, we can see that whether courts affirm or reject tradition, rulings on 
social group claims involve selections among norms about groups even when those 
normative positions remain unarticulated.  When courts reject arguments by social groups 
that traditional justifications for discriminatory laws are no longer valid, their decisions 
must be understood as strengthening the claim of the traditional norm, and not as neutral 
avoidance of the public debate.  Once stripped of the cover of the fact-based adjudication 
fiction, it becomes clear that affirmation of tradition is thus neither a neutral nor a non-
invasive approach to judicial review, notwithstanding protests to the contrary.  While 
other good reasons may exist to affirm tradition, the claim that rejection of social change-
based claims is necessarily more respectful of the judiciary’s limited, non-majoritarian 
role should not be counted among them.  
 
II.  The Pervasive Practice of Fact-Based Decision-Making 
Facts about social groups tend to dominate judicial opinions regarding group 
members’ rights.  Yet facts are only a small part of the analysis necessary to answer the 
standard constitutional inquiry whether a restriction on group members’ rights can be 
justified.34 Normative judgments about the weight to be accorded to facts that distinguish 
 
34 Heightened scrutiny will place greater demands on the fit between the government action and the 
characteristic of the group but the question whether a salient difference exists between members and non-
members is the same. 
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social groups play the critical analytic role, even though they typically appear in the guise 
of facts or are ignored altogether.35 
A.  “Thin” Facts and Unstated Norms 
Most facts will, on their own, be unable to tell us (or courts) whether the singling 
out of a social group for a legal burden is reasonable.  In the discussion here, I 
characterize these kinds of facts as “thin” because of their non-evaluative, empirical, and 
largely uncontested nature. 36 The “thin” fact that people with mental retardation learn 
differently than others, for example, does not, in itself, justify a limitation of rights.  The 
fact that women can give birth likewise does not itself justify rules treating women 
differently from men.  So too the fact that same-sex couples cannot conceive a child 
without third-party assistance does not tell us whether gay and lesbian couples may 
legitimately be excluded from marriage.  
We need more information—specifically, we need the social judgments 
associated with these empirical facts – to determine whether the “thin” factual differences 
between group members and others should be permitted to justify the legal restriction 
imposed.  With respect to mental retardation, for example, we might conclude that  
limitations on information-processing capacity justify less restrictive involuntary 
institutionalization rules for people with mental retardation than for people with mental 
 
35 While empirical facts play a leading role for the majority in this type of case, the dissent, if there is one, 
does not accord them the same centrality.  See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.  For clarity, 
references to judicial opinions throughout the article encompass majority and unanimous opinions unless 
otherwise indicated.    
36 I contrast “thin” facts with “thick” evaluative facts in Section II.B. infra.  Other typologies could be 
developed to capture courts’ treatment of facts that would extend beyond the thin/thick categories drawn 
here.  For example, additional categories could include facts that are a) mistaken; b) true but irrelevant; and 
c) unclear.  I thank Michael Klarman for this observation.  For purposes of understanding the judicial 
response to changing views of social groups, these distinctions that affect the entanglement of facts and 
norms are captured adequately by the thin/thick binary discussed here. 
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illness.37 Or we might conclude that the difference, while uncontestable as a factual 
matter, is not important for this purpose.38 We can see this, likewise, with respect to the 
facts of childbirth and conception.  Neither of these facts, which we conventionally think 
of as science-based or empirical, automatically generate a conclusion about the 
reasonableness of restrictions based on sex or sexual orientation.  It is the social overlay 
that enables that judgment.   
The point, simply put, is that empirical facts and the social norms related to them, 
while often seen as inextricably related, are actually separate strands of information.39 I
belabor the point, though it is an obvious one, because courts tend to ignore it while 
holding out empirical facts, alone, as sufficient to justify legal rules that distinguish 
between social groups.  In Heller v. Doe, for example, the Court did precisely that, citing 
facts about mental retardation related to the timing and methods of diagnosis to justify a 
lower standard of proof for involuntary commitment of people with mental retardation 
than people with mental illness.40 “Kentucky’s basic premise that mental retardation is 
easier to diagnose than is mental illness has a sufficient basis in fact,”41 the Court 
concluded.   
 
37 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (sustaining a Kentucky statute making it easier for the state to 
institutionalize involuntarily a person with mental retardation than a person with mental illness). 
38 See id. at 335-49 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
39 Norms themselves also should be understood as comprised of multiple judgments, even when they 
appear to express a broad, unilateral view of a characteristic or form of conduct.  When the norm is well-
settled, the individual strands of judgment remain unseen.  But if the general norm is contested and 
becomes destabilized, the strands become relevant as some specific norms fall away while others retain 
their force.  A general norm disapproving homosexuality, for instance, may be comprised of several 
specific strands—some disapproving adult relationships with children as parents or teachers; others related 
to valuing non-gay partnerships over gay partnerships; and still others related to disapproval of gay people 
as tenants or employees.  As the broad norm becomes destabilized, some strands will carry greater force 
than others, as will be discussed in greater detail below.    
40 Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-23. 
41 Id. at 322; see also id. at 323 (“Mental retardation is a permanent, relatively static condition, [] so a 
determination of dangerousness may be made with some accuracy based on previous behavior.”); id. at 324 
(“The prevailing methods of treatment for the mentally retarded, as a general rule, are much less invasive 
than are those given the mentally ill.”).  More generally, the Court concluded that the “distinction between 
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill” is a matter of “commonsense.”  Id. at 326-27. 
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Similarly, the fact of childbirth became the focal explanation for the sex-based 
citizenship rule in Nguyen v. INS, where the Court relied on women’s role in childbirth to 
sustain an immigration law that made it easier for U.S. citizen mothers than U.S. citizen 
fathers to have citizenship conferred on their foreign-born children.42 That empirical fact, 
reasoned the Court, enabled mothers to be more likely than fathers to develop the “real, 
everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the 
United States.”43 Likewise, the biological facts of procreation have been relied upon to 
validate the exclusion of gay couples from marriage.44 
In treating an empirical fact as proof of the reasonableness of a related law, courts 
thus relegate the social norm, which is doing the actual probative work, to a behind-the-
 
42 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001).  For purposes of the analysis here, I am setting aside the obvious point that 
childbirth itself provides evidence of parentage, placing women in a different position from men.  I do so 
because although the majority found this evidentiary justification supported the rule, it separately accepted 
the government’s argument that mothers, by virtue of giving birth, are more likely than fathers to develop a 
meaningful relationship with the child.  Id. at 64-65. 
43 Id. at 65.  Some evolutionary biologists would point to gendered differences in endocrinology, including 
women’s capacity for lactation, to argue that women’s child-nurturing orientation is a fact, not a norm.  
However, the methodological assumptions that support the equation of biology with nurturing instinct are 
highly contested in ways that the fact of lactation (or childbirth) is not.  For that reason, perhaps, 
contentions regarding endocrinological differences are not the sort of facts on which courts tend to rely to 
justify sex-based rules.  The same is true for the contentions regarding ethnic differences in cognitive 
ability espoused in The Bell Curve and similar literature; while the conclusions are offered as empirical 
fact, they have not received wide acceptance as such, at least in part because of the contested methodology 
underlying them.   
Some would argue that normative commitments to equality override society’s (and courts’) 
willingness to consider “real,” empirical differences based on race or sex, among other characteristics.  
Others would maintain that the methodology these authors utilize to reach conclusions regarding racial 
differences in intelligence is itself embedded with the normative presumptions it purports to prove.  On 
either view, because the alleged facts are not widely considered uncontestable, they lack the credibility-
preserving function that uncontested facts bring to judicial analysis.  See infra Part V.  For related debate 
arising from the statements of Lawrence Summer regarding the relationship between sex and scientific 
aptitude, compare, e.g., Olivia Judson, Op-Ed, Different but (Probably) Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, 
§ 4, at 17, with W. Michael Fox & Richard Alm, Op-Ed, Scientists Are Made, Not Born, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2005, at A19.   
44 See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing approvingly the 
opinions of several courts that “rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the limitation of marriage to 
members of the opposite sex [by relying] upon the role that marriage plays in procreation and in providing 
the optimal environment for child rearing”).  See also infra text accompanying notes 217-224.  
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scenes role.45 In Heller, for example, something more than differences in processing 
skills had to be at issue to sustain the different institutionalization rules; after all, that 
same information-processing difference did not justify the zoning rule in City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center that singled out for restriction a group home for people with 
mental retardation.46 Similarly in Nguyen, the biology of childbirth and demographic 
statistics related to childrearing could not do the probative work for which they were 
relied on by the Court.  As the Court itself had recognized previously, neither “inherent” 
nor demographic differences between men and women alone can justify sex-based 
rules.47 Likewise, the empirical facts of procreation themselves cannot explain the legal 
distinction between gay and non-gay people in marriage law.   If they did, we would 
expect to see legal distinctions based on sexual orientation outside of marriage, which we 
largely do not, and we would expect every marriage lawsuit brought by a gay couple to 
be decided the same way.     
The reason for sustaining one distinction and rejecting another thus lies not in 
empirical facts but instead in normative judgments that give social meaning to “thin” 
factual differences.  But how can these judgments about group members’ capacity or 
status go unmentioned as they fill in the pieces between the facts about a group and a 
restrictive law limiting group members’ rights?  It is the legal fiction that facts can lead 
directly to judgments, which undergirds the concept of fact-based adjudication advanced 
 
45 As will be elaborated below, there is a set of cases in which norms are declared to be decisive.  But this 
generally occurs when a norm is thought to be well-settled by virtue of earlier opinions or positive law, 
which avoids or at least moderates concerns about judicial overreaching.  See infra Part II.B.   
46 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450-51 (1985).  
47 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between 
men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the 
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity”); Wengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (holding that wives’ greater financial dependence on their 
husbands could not justify a sex-based workers’ compensation rule regarding death benefit eligibility); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 114-117. 
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here, that facilitates this type of undertheorized decision making.  In effect, fact-based 
adjudication enables courts to engage in a form of judicial notice through which they 
incorporate the social overlay given to empirical facts.  Unlike ordinary judicial notice, 
however, which requires transparency regarding assumptions made by courts, judicial 
assumptions regarding social norms generally go unmentioned.  The fiction of fact-based 
adjudication thus enables hosts of normative determinations about the capacity and status 
of social groups to operate both unidentified by and undefended in majority opinions 
even as those normative judgments determine the analysis. 
The work of these norms is often made explicit by dissents, which regularly 
identify and challenge the majority’s unspoken normative judgments.  In Heller, for 
example, Justice Souter’s dissent (for four members of the Court) conceded that 
“[o]bviously there are differences between mental retardation and mental illness,”48 but 
concluded that the factual differences could not support Kentucky’s separate rules.  
Instead, Justice Souter argued, an impermissible norm, unacknowledged by the majority, 
enabled these factual differences to be given undeserved significance.  It is “difficult,” he 
wrote, “to see [the classification, which gave family members greater control over 
institutionalization of people with mental retardation than people with mental illness] as 
resting on anything other than the stereotypical assumption that the retarded are 
‘perpetual children.’”49 
48 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 337 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).  In addition to highlighting the norms 
that he believed to be at work, Justice Souter also disagreed with the majority’s account of empirical 
differences between mental retardation and mental illness.  See id. at 342-46 (arguing , based on social 
science literature, that treatment of people with mental retardation often involves invasive procedures, 
contrary to the majority’s contention); see also id. at 342 (“[A]ny apparent plausibility in the Court’s 
suggestion that ‘the mentally retarded in general are not subjected to [invasive mind-altering treatment] 
dissipates the moment we examine readily available material on the subject, including studies . . . cited by 
the Court.”) (internal citation omitted).   
49 Id. at 348.    
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The dissenters in Nguyen similarly criticized the majority’s move directly from 
empirical fact to legal conclusion via an unacknowledged (and, according to the dissent, 
impermissible) norm.50 They stressed the lack of automaticity between the empirical fact 
(women give birth to children) identified as decisive by the majority and the sex-based 
citizenship rule that imposed a lesser burden on mothers than fathers.51 “The physical 
differences between men and women . . . do not justify [the statute’s] discrimination,” 
O’Connor wrote.52 She added that the majority could connect the two and sustain the 
challenged law only by overlaying the empirical fact of childbirth with the normative 
view that women have a stronger instinct to parent than men. 
The claim that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the 
goal of a “real, practical relationship” . . . finds support not in biological 
differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., “the generalization that 
mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . to develop caring 
relationships with their children.”  Such a claim relies on “the very 
stereotype the law condemns,” “lends credibility” to the generalization, 
and helps convert that “assumption” into “a self-fulfilling prophecy.”53 
And this normative view, she contended, was impermissible.   
Romer v. Evans54 illustrates the point as well, although in Romer the dissent 
highlighted a normative judgment about the social group in question that, in its view, 
should have overlaid the majority’s analysis and validated the challenged Colorado ban 
 
50 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 88-89. 
52 Id. at 87 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).  To strengthen the case that an impermissible 
traditional norm had been applied, Justice O’Connor situated the law historically, declaring it 
“paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, 
for nonmarital children.”  Id. at 92 (citing to legislative history).  
 The dissenters also rejected the majority’s fact-based conclusion that more evidence of parenthood 
is needed from fathers than mothers because the evidence of pregnancy and childbirth is missing.  See id. at 
81-82 (“[A] mother will not always have formal legal documentation of birth because a birth certificate 
may not issue or may subsequently be lost. Conversely, a father’s name may well appear on a birth 
certificate. While it is doubtless true that a mother’s blood relation to a child is uniquely ‘verifiable from 
the birth itself’ to those present at birth, the majority has not shown that a mother’s birth relation is 
uniquely verifiable by the INS, much less that any greater verifiability warrants a sex-based, rather than a 
sex-neutral, statute.”) (internal citation omitted). 
53 Id. at 88-89 (internal citations omitted). 
54 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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on antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay men and bisexuals.  The majority had 
pinned its rejection of the government’s proffered rationales55 on the lack of connection 
between those rationales and the surrounding facts.  Given the sweep of the amendment, 
no facts could be sufficient to justify Colorado’s action, the Court wrote.  It characterized 
the amendment as “a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context” that 
might support its legitimacy.56 While the majority admittedly did not hinge its decision 
on facts specific to gay people, it also avoided engaging with normative judgments 
directly related to gay people.  In response, the dissent chastised the majority for 
improperly disregarding a legitimate norm—“moral disapproval of homosexual conduct” 
—that could have established a connection between the amendment’s classification, the 
empirical facts regarding gay people, and Colorado’s alleged interests in preserving 
associational freedom and scarce resources.57 
B.  “Thick” Facts and the Merger of Norm Into “Fact” 
Sometimes, in contrast to the “thin” empirical facts described in the preceding 
discussion, “facts” about a social group on which courts rely actually do justify, as a 
logical matter, restrictions on group members’ rights.  The “facts” that people with 
mental retardation are “socially inadequate” and “manifestly unfit,” for example, could 
reasonably support the conclusion that the state may sterilize them.58 Similarly, the 
“fact” that women are naturally domestic itself justifies restrictions on women’s role in 
 
55 Id. at 635 (describing the rationales as “respect for . . . the liberties of landlords or employers who have 
personal or religious objections to homosexuality” and “interest in conserving resources to fight 
discrimination against other groups”). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See also infra note 112. 
58 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
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the workplace.59 Likewise, the “fact” that gay people are less able than non-gay people 
to parent children supports a ban on adoption by lesbians and gay men.60 
Yet these “facts” have explanatory bite precisely because they contain judgments 
under the pretense of empiricism.  Put another way, while they are put forward as truths, 
which would suggest they are subject to observation-based verification, they actually 
contain both description (group X has a particular characteristic) and evaluation (the 
characteristic limits the status or capacity of group X).61 In the typology set out here, I 
term them “thick” facts or normative facts to capture their loaded, evaluative nature.   
This is not to suggest that courts are always conscious of the normative judgments 
embedded in the thick facts on which they rely.  To the contrary, during the time that they 
are thought of as fact rather than norm, these “facts” are frequently characterized and 
understood as “natural” attributes of the affected social group.62 Normative judgments, in 
other words, have great power to shape perceptions of fact.  The “fact” that women were 
seen as naturally better suited than men to care for home and hearth is illustrative.  For 
 
59 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J. concurring). 
60 See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(characterizing parenting by a mother and father as the “optimal social structure” for childrearing), reh’g en 
banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
61 The identification of “facts” as including normative judgments in addition to empirical truths about 
group members is post-hoc.  At the time they are relied upon, these “facts” often are so deeply naturalized 
by the surrounding society that they are believed by both courts and the surrounding society to be 
empirical.  Only later, when perceptions of group members change, do the normative judgments reflected 
in these facts come to be seen, and, often, rejected by courts.  Cf. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Polity, in 
RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY 13, 18-19 (Susan E. Babbitt & Sue Campbell eds., 1999) (“The point is . . . that a 
political philosophy necessarily involves factual (descriptive and theoretical) assumptions as well as 
normative claims about the polity, and if the former are not explicitly stated and highlighted as integral to 
the political philosophy, it is often simply because they are part of the conservative, background ‘common 
sense’ that its proponents take for granted.”). 
Courts are not merely passive players here, however.  By selecting among facts, they reinforce 
perceptions that those facts are true, even when they are not empirically supportable.  In Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), for example, Justice Bradley’s concurrence, which stressed that women were 
unsuited for employment outside the home in light of their domestic natures and responsibilities, not only 
rested on but also reinforced an inaccurate perception of women as purely domestic at a time when many 
women were employed in the labor force.  Id. at 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).  Further, some 
would argue that courts deploy norms as facts strategically to avoid the conflict associated with supporting 
controversial norms.  See infra Part VI. 
62 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (observing that the Court’s Justices are 
sometimes able to perceive significant facts . . . that eluded their predecessors”). 
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many courts (and the surrounding society),63 the empirical fact of women’s greater 
likelihood to be primary caregivers for children evidenced not just a demographic reality 
but also a “truth” ordained by nature that woman’s place was in the home.64 From this 
“natural” fact, all sorts of distinctions between men and women reasonably could be 
sustained.65 
The conflation of fact and norm into normative fact typically becomes apparent 
only after perceptions of the status or capacity of social group members have shifted.  
When the reality of women’s lives could no longer be reconciled with the image of 
women as helpless and ignorant, for example, the normative, gendered nature of the 
presumptions underlying assertions of women’s natural domesticity became clear.66 
Until that time, though, normative facts and empirical facts tend to function 
indistinguishably in the eyes of courts. 
Some of the most striking uses of normative facts to justify legal burdens on 
social groups appear in early race discrimination cases, where normative judgments about 
African Americans were treated as facts that proved the legal relevance of racial 
differences.   In 1867, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the state’s 
antimiscegenation law on the ground that “[t]he natural separation of the races is . . . an 
undeniable fact.”67 By treating the normative conclusion about racial separation as 
 
63 As Michael Klarman has observed, judges typically share the normative views (and, consequently, the 
perceptions of norms as fact) that are popular in the elite social circles in which they live and work.  See 
Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1998). 
64 This conversion of a demographic fact into “natural” truth about a social group was selective, of course.  
Demographic research also showed that many women—particularly women who were not white or married 
to wealthy men—worked outside the home.  Yet courts disregarded these other facts in making 
determinations about women’s capacity.   
65 See, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J. concurring); Gosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66 
(1948) (validating Michigan’s sex-based restrictions for liquor licenses).   
66 Some evolutionary biologists would point to gendered differences in endocrinology and the capacity for 
lactation to argue that women’s domestic orientation is a fact, not a norm.  As mentioned earlier, however, 
courts do not rely on these facts as the basis for sex-based differential treatment.  See supra note  43. 
67 West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (1867) (emphasis added). 
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“natural,” the court facilitated a logical flow between the “facts” and the challenged 
law.68 
Around the same time, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the state’s 
antimiscegenation statute based on “[o]ur daily observation . . . that the offspring of these 
unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in 
physical development and strength, to the fullblood of either race.”69 Sustaining a similar 
law in 1883, the Missouri Supreme Court pointed to the “well authenticated fact that if 
the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, 
intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny.”70 
Analogous deployments of normative facts appear in cases involving social 
groups defined by sex, mental retardation and sexual orientation, among other 
characteristics.  A few additional illustrations are offered here to flesh out the work of 
these “thick” facts.   
In the context of sex-based distinctions, Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in 
Bradwell v. Illinois71 is perhaps the most familiar example of a norm operating as fact.  
From the “fact” of “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex,”72 Justice Bradley concluded that women were “unfit[] . . . for many of the 
occupations of civil life,” including the practice of law.73 Famously too, the Supreme 
 
68 See id. at 213-14 (defending decision as “not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to 
suffer men to follow the law of races . . . and not to compel them to intermix contrary to their instincts”). 
69 Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). 
70 State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).   
71 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
72 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).    
73 Id. In doing so, he also commingled empirical facts, like the law of coverture, along with other “facts” 
like “the law of the Creator” to reinforce his conclusion about women’s capacity.  Id. 
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Court in Muller v. Oregon74 converted the demonstrable fact of biological sex differences 
into the normative fact of women’s physical limitations.   
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by 
each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, 
particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future 
well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and 
in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.75 
From these “facts,” the conclusion that restrictions on women’s labor were permissible 
flowed logically:  “This difference justifies a difference in legislation, and upholds that 
which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.”76 
Buck v. Bell77 illustrates the similar operation of norms-as-facts in connection 
with mental retardation.  In upholding the Virginia law authorizing sterilization of 
“mental defectives” on due process grounds, Justice Holmes, in his brief opinion, did not 
discuss mental retardation in terms of its empirical effect on intellectual capacity.78 
Instead, consistent with the views of the day and his own views, he treated as fact that 
people with mental retardation were potential “menace[s],” “manifestly unfit,” and more 
 
74 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
75 Id. at 422.  Justice O’Connor’s point in Nguyen, discussed above, was that the Court had again taken 
physical differences between men and women and imputed them impermissibly with normative 
significance to justify upholding differential sex-based rules.  See supra text accompanying notes 50-53. 
 State courts took an approach to women’s and men’s physical differences similar to that of the 
Muller majority.  Calling on received wisdom about women’s physical capacities, the New York Court of 
Appeals observed that “no one doubts that as regards bodily strength and endurance, [woman] is inferior 
and that her health in the field of physical labor must be specially guarded by the state.”  People v. Charles 
Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915).  In an earlier ruling in the Washington Territory, the 
territorial supreme court likewise pointed to physical differences between men and women to bolster the 
normative fact that women lacked the sort of competence required of grand jurors.  Harland v. Territory, 3 
Wash. Terr. 131 (1887).  Jury duty, the court wrote, imposed a responsibility “so onerous and burdensome” 
that it was “utterly unsuited to the physical constitution of females.”  Id. at 140.   
76 Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23.  The power of this gendered normative fact to rationalize a restriction on 
women’s work hours may help explain how the Court could have sustained that law while striking down on 
contractual freedom grounds nearly all other protective legislation that came before the Court in the same 
time period.  Of course, other related factors, including a lesser tradition of contractual freedom for women 
than men also might have influenced the Court.  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1960, 1969 (2003) (book review) (stating that at the time of Muller, “[t]he Supreme Court . . 
. was not yet ready to treat women as fully equal citizens entitled to the same degree of liberty of contract 
as men.”). 
77 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
78 Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 n.9 (1985) (discussing four 
categories of mental retardation based on IQ scores).    
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prone to crime and dependence on public support than others.79 In other words, the fears 
and related normative judgments about the dangers of people with mental retardation that 
were popular at the time were presented as empirical fact.80 As a result, the analytic 
move from fact to justification was perfectly logical; the normative fact itself did 
sufficient explanatory work to sustain the decision to sterilize Carrie Bell. 
In the context of sexual orientation, a recent Eleventh Circuit ruling actually 
conceded that the “fact” about gay people on which it relied to sustain Florida’s ban on 
adoption by lesbians and gay men was not subject to substantiation.81 Florida had argued 
that “children benefit from the presence of both a father and mother in the home” more 
than they would from two parents of the same sex.82 Although extensive expert 
testimony had contested this “fact” at trial, the court concluded that it was “one of those 
‘unprovable assumptions’ that nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative 
action.”83 Affirmation of the state’s adoption ban flowed logically from the acceptance 
 
79 Buck, 274 U.S. at 206-07.  At the same time, we know that Justice Holmes was not particularly 
concerned with the accuracy of the facts before him.  “I hate facts,” he once wrote in response to Justice 
Brandeis’ suggestion that he visit textile mills in Massachusetts.  2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932 13 (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961) (1941). 
80 In his opinion in Cleburne, Justice Marshall elaborated the widespread use of normative facts about 
people with mental retardation to justify severe burdens.  As part of his historical argument for heightened 
scrutiny of mental retardation-based classifications, he noted that by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
“leading medical authorities and others began to portray the ‘feeble-minded’ as a ‘menace to society and 
civilization . . . responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems.’”  Cleburne, 473 
U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring).  These views then became the normative facts that guided the 
analysis in Buck v. Bell. Cf. Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 
283 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (invalidating statute premised on the assumption “that certain retarded children are 
uneducable and untrainable”). 
81 Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc 
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
82 Id. at 819.  This “fact” has been contested strenuously by many experts as well as the 11th Circuit’s 
dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc.  See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297 (Barkett, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he fact that Florida places children for adoption with single parents directly and explicitly contradicts 
Florida’s post hoc assertion that the ban is justified by the state’s wish to place children for adoption only 
with ‘families with married mothers and fathers.’”); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the 
Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 159 (2001). 
83 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20.  The court might have been discomfited by its admission that the rationale 
on which it rested depended on gut instinct.  Shortly after acknowledging the absence of proof for its 
assumption that mothers and fathers were better for children than two mothers or two fathers, the court 
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of this normative fact.  After all, if gay couples are believed to be less suitable parents 
than non-gay couples, how could the state do anything other than ban gay people from 
adopting?84 The normative fact, in other words, “explained” the classification.   
In sum, the facts held out as decisive by many courts turn out to supply little of a 
decision’s reasoning.  Instead, it is the norms associated with or embedded in those facts 
that do the explanatory work in adjudication related to social groups, even as those norms 
remain unspoken. 
 
III.  Fact-Based Interventions in Contested Normative Terrain 
The fiction of fact-based decision-making operates forcefully when invoked by 
courts in response to social groups’ claims that changed societal views require 
reconsideration and rejection of traditional rationales for restricting group members’ 
rights.  In these cases, courts typically remain silent regarding their normative positions 
and either embrace “new” facts about a group or hew to old ones.  Eventually, as fact-
based decisions accrete, courts appear to gain the confidence necessary to tip toward 
making explicitly norm-based decisions.  This Part will track these dynamics and close 
with consideration of the point at which norm contests become relevant to adjudication 
regarding social groups.  Later Parts will analyze the practical and theoretical conditions 
 
pointed to the failure of “the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience . . . [to] 
discover[] a superior model” to the household headed by a mother and a father.  Id. at 820. 
 This is not the first time a court has relied on unprovable assumptions.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
specifically endorsed these sorts of assumptions in connection with obscenity, holding that “a state 
legislature may [] act on the [] assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused 
on obscene conduct, ha[s] a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial 
behavior[.]”  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).  The cases on which the Court relied 
for this proposition in Paris, however, concerned antitrust, securities, environmental regulation, and 
obscenity.  See id. at 61-63.  None concerned assumptions regarding social groups or the effect of aspects 
of individual identity. 
84 Of course, the same normative fact could support restrictions on gay parents other than an outright 
adoption ban.  For example, via this normative fact, Florida also could ban gay people from serving as 
foster parents, which it does not, or place gay parents at the bottom of an adoption priority list.     
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that lead courts to prefer facts to norm declarations while views of social groups are in 
contest.
A.   Intervention Via “New” Facts 
The judicial inclination toward norm avoidance where social norms are in contest 
can be seen in a wide range of cases brought by social groups maintaining that 
traditionally accepted rationales for discriminatory treatment must give way in light of 
changing social views.85 Brown v. Board of Education86 is perhaps the best-known 
example of the judicial inclination to use “new” facts to justify new conclusions about 
previously settled matters while avoiding mention of the underlying norm shifts.  In 
reversing Plessy v. Ferguson’s87 separate but equal doctrine as applied to public 
education, the Court identified “modern” knowledge as its analytic linchpin:  “Whatever 
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding [that racially segregated schooling causes harm] is amply supported by 
modern authority.”88 The Court also pointed to other changed facts to support its 
analysis, noting, for example, the changed “status of public education”89 and the 
heightened achievements of African Americans in professional and cultural circles.90 
Nowhere in the decision did norms regarding African Americans or racial equality 
 
85 While the social group will contend that society’s views have changed in ways that render ongoing 
discrimination impermissible, courts may or may not agree with that characterization.  For further 
discussion of when and why norm shifts gain traction with courts, see infra 135-151. 
86 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
87 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
88 Brown, 347 U.S at 494. 
89 Id. at 489.  See also id. at 492-93 (“We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”). 
90 Id. at 490 (“Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences 
as well as in the business and professional world.”).  Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 
(1992) (explaining that “the Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts 
apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision [in Brown] to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not 
only justified but required.”). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
28
receive mention.91 Later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,92 the Court reinforced that 
changed conceptions of facts, rather than changes to social norms, accounted for Plessy’s 
reversal.  As the Court explained, “the Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so 
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision [in Brown] to 
reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified but required.”93 
The California Supreme Court similarly treated “new” facts regarding race as 
decisive in striking down the state’s antimiscegenation law at a time when such laws 
were widely viewed as permissible.94 The factual grounds for race discrimination in 
 
91 In offering a rationale for Brown different from the one advanced by the Court, Charles Black 
acknowledged the Court’s reliance on facts rather than norm declarations in its opinion. 
It seems to me that the venial fault of the opinions consists in its not spelling out that 
segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race.  (I 
would conjecture that the motive for this omission was reluctance to go into the 
distasteful details of the southern caste system.)  That such treatment is generally not 
good for children needs less talk than the Court gives it. 
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1959-60). 
The surrounding global political context, in which the persistence of racial segregation was 
perceived as undermining the United States’ position in the Cold War, also went unmentioned in Brown.
See Mary L. Dudziak, Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War, 81 J. AM. HIST. 543, 544 (1994) 
(“On one hand, the United States claimed that democracy was superior to communism as a form of 
government, particularly in its protection of individual rights and liberties; on the other hand, the nation 
practiced pervasive race discrimination. . . . The Soviet Union and the Communist press in various nations 
used the race issue very effectively in anti-American propaganda.”). 
 For illustration of state court inclinations to avoiding normative declarations that might be subject 
to contestation, see, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (citing facts about how 
two gay men lived together as “permanent life partners” to include them within the statutory term “family” 
for purposes of succession to a rent-controlled apartment rather than making the normative judgment that 
would be required to decide whether unlawful sexual orientation or marital status discrimination underlay 
the attempted eviction). 
92 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
93 Id. at 863.  The Court in Casey also recognized that its pattern of fact-based decision-making carried 
over to contexts unrelated to shifting judgments about social groups.  Discussing the Lochner era and its 
demise, the Court observed that  
West Coast Hotel [v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)] . . . rested on facts, or an understanding of 
facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional 
resolutions.  Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the country could 
understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day . . . had not 
been able to perceive.  As the decisions were thus comprehensible they were also defensible . . . as 
applications of constitutional principles to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. 
Id. at 863-64. 
94 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).  See also Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell:  Scientific Racism 
and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 601 (2000) (describing the 
court’s ruling as “the first true crack in the courts’ monolithic support for the constitutionality of 
miscegenation statutes”); see also Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (sustaining 
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marriage had long been seen as well-settled:  “[T]he prohibition of intermarriage . . . 
prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose members are by 
nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians.”95 In response, the court turned to 
science to demonstrate that the once-operative facts96 had discredited normative 
underpinnings.  
The categorical statement that non-Caucasians are inherently physically 
inferior is without scientific proof.  In recent years scientists have attached 
great weight to the fact that their segregation in a generally inferior 
environment greatly increases their liability to physical ailments.97 
The court also pointed to the absence of “scientific proof that one race is superior to 
another in native ability.”98 Once it had framed the facts in this way, its rejection of the 
racial classification seemed all but mandatory.99 
Although the Court’s decision upholding the University of Michigan Law 
School’s consideration of race in admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger100 arguably involves 
the issue of affirmative action more so than the social group of African Americans or 
people of color more broadly, it similarly illustrates the judicial preference for 
intervening in contested normative territory via facts.  Rather than declare affirmative 
action to be a normatively desirable form of redress for past discrimination,101 the Court 
 
Alabama’s antimiscegenation statute), cert. denied, 72 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1954); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 
749 (Va. 1955) (sustaining Virginia’s similar law). 
95 Perez, 198 P.2d at 23. 
96 Cf. id. at 26 (“Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears, [defenders of the antimiscegenation law] 
reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior in health, intelligence, and culture, and that this 
inferiority proves the need of the barriers of race prejudice.”). 
97 Id. at 23-24.  
98 Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted) (also observing that ‘[t]he data on which Caucasian superiority is based 
have undergone considerable re-evaluation by social and physical scientists in the past two decades.”). 
99 To support this analytic move, the court also highlighted Gunnar Myrdal’s work linking the earlier 
normative facts about race to bias in observation.  Id. at 723 n.6.  The court held out Myrdal’s observations, 
together with the scientific data just mentioned, as requiring its conclusion that previous beliefs about 
African Americans amounted to norms rather than facts.  Id. (“ ‘[T]he ordinary white American . . . has 
made an error in inferring that observed differences were innate and a part of  ‘nature’ ’ ”).      
100 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
101 Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views from the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative 
Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001). 
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focused on the factual benefits derived from student diversity, as evidenced by “expert 
studies and reports entered into evidence at trial.”102 “Numerous studies show that 
student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals,’” 
the Court wrote.103 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court acknowledge the contestable 
methodological choices made by the studies on which it relied.104 
Early decisions in the contemporary women’s rights cases also illustrate this 
pattern of norm-avoidance.  Beginning with Reed v. Reed,105 numerous fact-based 
decisions reflected a commitment to women’s equality without ever acknowledging the 
shift from earlier, contrary norms.  In Reed, the Court highlighted a fact (women have at 
least as much experience as men with administering estates) to help explain its 
determination that Idaho’s subordination of wives to husbands in prioritizing estate 
administrators was arbitrary.106 It never mentioned, much less refuted, the traditional 
sex-based norm relied on by the Idaho Supreme Court to sustain the law:  “[N]ature itself 
has established the distinction” between men and women, the Idaho court wrote.107 By 
sidestepping this traditionally accepted judgment about men and women and offering up 
facts instead, the U.S. Supreme Court left the norm confrontation for another day.108 
102 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citation omitted). 
103 Id. (citation omitted). 
104 Arguably, Justice O’Connor’s statement that the “path to leadership” must be “visibly open to talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity” to insure leaders’ “legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry,” id. at 332, constitutes a norm declaration regarding the value of affirmative action.  See Brown-
Nagin, supra note 4, at 1484 (describing this statement as “the most morally focused argument for race-
conscious admissions in the majority opinion”).  However, the statement also can be read as a positive 
description of affirmative action’s effects on democracy and legitimacy, rather than as a commitment to 
affirmative action as a moral good. 
105 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
106 Id. at 76-77. 
107 Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970). 
108 In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S 632 (1974), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 419 U.S. 822 
(1974), among others, the Court similarly invalidated pregnancy-based and sex-based rules, not by 
declaring normative opposition to those sorts of legal distinctions, but instead by finding that the facts 
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 Romer v. Evans109 illustrates this same point with respect to sexual orientation 
classifications.  Until Romer, Bowers v. Hardwick’s declaration that homosexuality was 
rightfully the subject of moral and legislative disapproval represented the prevailing 
constitutional discourse regarding homosexuality.110 Thus, for Romer to recognize the 
claim that a state constitutional ban on antidiscrimination protections for gay people 
violated the rights of lesbians and gay men, it had to reject, or at least deviate from, the 
traditionally embraced views of gay people reflected in Bowers. Yet the majority opinion 
did not acknowledge this move.  As noted earlier, it refused to recognize the normative 
shift implicit in its decision and instead anchored its invalidation of Colorado’s 
amendment on the ban’s factual disconnect with the state’s asserted interests.111 Despite 
Justice Scalia’s objection in dissent that the traditional social norm disapproving of 
homosexuality sufficed to justify the challenged measure,112 the Romer Court avoided 
any overt engagement with that moral judgment.113 
As these cases illustrate, when breaking with tradition, the Court has led with 
facts and left norms aside.  
B.  Fact-Based Decisions as the Groundwork for Norm Declarations 
Even in light of courts’ apparent preference for fact-based decision-making in 
 
related to pregnancy and to child care did not support the legal restriction imposed.  This is true as well for 
cases affirming sex-based distinctions post-Reed, such as Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), in which norm declarations were largely absent from the 
majority opinion and the focus was, instead, on the factual support for the challenged rules. 
109 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
110 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)    
111 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.  See also supra note 55 (describing Colorado’s rationales).      
112 “It is unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion” of the moral disapproval rationale, Justice Scalia 
wrote, “since the answer [to the question of the rationale’s applicability here] is so obviously yes.”  Id. at 
640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 653 (describing as legitimate the people’s desire “to prevent 
piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans”). 
113 Romer could be characterized as a “norm” case to the extent it is read to announce (or affirm) a general 
norm that hostility toward a group of people cannot justify restrictions on the rights of group members.  To 
the extent Romer is understood as signaling a shift in the constitutional rights of gay people, however, the 
Court left that normative shift unacknowledged.    
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contested cultural arenas, it would strain credibility to suggest that courts avoid norms 
altogether.  My argument, instead, is that fact-based decision-making is the first step of a 
two-step decision-making dynamic.  As numerous cases illustrate, fact-based decisions 
lay the groundwork for later declarations of normative shifts; overt rejection of traditional 
views about the worth of social groups tends to occur only after one or more fact-based 
decisions have effectively, though not explicitly, disavowed the previously embraced 
norms.  We might think of this process as involving the accretion of fact-based 
decisions—once the “new” understanding of facts has become settled, the potential 
controversy associated with judicial intervention into contested normative terrain is 
diminished.  This accretion model applies not only to review of individual cases but also, 
as I will show below, to the labeling of classifications as suspect or quasi-suspect.   
The trajectory of women’s rights cases nicely illustrates the accretion dynamic.  
Only after Reed and several additional fact-intensive opinions that sustained claims for 
sex equality did a majority of the Court openly embrace the normative value of sex 
equality.  When the Court ultimately made that commitment explicit, it treated its move 
not as declaring a “new” norm but as articulating a norm whose settlement was evidenced 
by earlier (fact-based) decisions.  For example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual 
Insurance Co.,114 the Court found that women’s disproportionate financial dependence on 
their husbands could not support a workers’ compensation provision requiring widowers 
but not widows to prove dependence before recovering death benefits.115 Although that 
fact undoubtedly would have been taken to justify the different rule in the past, and, 
 
114 446 U.S. 142 (1980). 
115 Id. at 151 (“It may be that there is empirical support for the proposition that men are more likely to be 
the principal supporters of their spouses and families.”).   
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art34
33
indeed, was treated as decisive by the lower court,116 the Court declared the devaluation 
of women’s work relative to their husbands’ to conflict with a now-settled norm of sex 
equality:  “It is this kind of discrimination against working women that our cases have 
identified and in the circumstances found unjustified.”117 
The accretion phenomenon also explains the timing of announcements of 
heightened scrutiny.  These declared commitments to rigorous review of particular 
classifications have occurred only after the accretion of a series of fact-based decisions 
regarding the social group in question.118 Once earlier decisions are in place, the 
Supreme Court appeared to reach a comfort level that serious contestation of the social 
group’s status relative to its counterpart group has passed.  Heightened scrutiny, in other 
words, signals the settlement of a “new” general norm (at least from the Court’s 
perspective) that promotes skepticism toward specific judgments about social group 
members that previously would have been found to justify different treatment.119 This 
 
116 See id. at 150 (“‘[T]he substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women 
justifies the advantage that [the law] administratively gives to a widow.’”) (quoting Wengler, 583 S.W.2d 
162, 168 (Mo. 1979)).  For discussion of earlier norms and their influence on workers compensation and 
wrongful death statutes, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN LAW (2004).   
117 Wengler, 446 U.S. at 147.   See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) (holding that 
facts related to women’s workforce participation “certainly put to rest the suggestion that all women should 
be exempt from jury service based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home”); Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (invalidating sex-based child support rule based on judicial notice of 
“[t]he presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life” 
and the related conclusion that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the 
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas”).  
118 Heightened scrutiny, after all, represents a deviation from court’s ordinary orientation toward norm 
avoidance as it reflects an explicit commitment to skepticism toward distinctions based on facts about the 
protected social group.    
119 This point is somewhat more complicated with respect to racial classifications than with respect to the 
sex classifications discussed below.  For one, some version of a race equality norm was acknowledged by 
courts almost immediately after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments.  See Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303-08 (1879).  At the same time, however, this recognition did not translate into 
broad skepticism of racial classifications.  See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).  Further, 
even after the Court first characterized race as a “suspect” ground for classification in Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), the Court did not begin actual rigorous review of racial classifications for 
another twenty years.  See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “strong policy” against racial classifications); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality 
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 496-503 (2004) (analyzing evolution of suspect classification 
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trajectory—of fact-based cases first and norm declarations thereafter—also helps explain 
why the Court appeared to be applying heightened scrutiny in cases involving both sex 
and illegitimacy classifications before it acknowledged that it was doing so.120 
Once heightened scrutiny has been declared, an equality norm begins to reshape 
consideration of facts (and judgments related to those facts) about the social group in 
adjudication.  In United States v. Virginia,121 for example, the Court overrode perceived 
factual differences between men and women and relied on a sex equality norm to 
invalidate Virginia Military Institute’s sex-based admission policy.122 Likewise, in J.E.B. 
v. Alabama,123 the Court recognized possible differences between male and female jurors 
but rejected sex-based peremptory strikes on equality grounds.124 This is not to suggest 
that the sex equality norm always carries the day, as Nguyen and other cases show.125 
But, as in Wengler and Virginia, among others, the application of heightened scrutiny 
 
analysis); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 
232 (1991) (same).   
120 Many scholars have maintained that the Court had been applying heightened scrutiny to sex 
classifications since Reed. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-26 (2d ed. 
1988); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1972).  The Court 
likewise appeared to be applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications of nonmarital children long before 
its formal pronouncement of quasi-suspect classification status for those classifications in 1988.  See Clark 
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Gunther, supra, at 33-36. 
121 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
122 See id. at 533-34 (finding that “inherent differences between men and women” did not justify 
constraints on women’s opportunities and that sex-based classifications “may not be used, as they once 
were, [] to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”) (citations and 
punctuation omitted). 
123 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
124 Id. at 138-42. 
125 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).  See also Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 
U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statute that subjected only men to criminal liability for statutory rape).  One 
might argue that the accretion phenomenon should lead Nguyen to come out differently, given that it was 
decided relatively late in the evolution of women’s rights cases.  As noted earlier, however, see supra note 
39, when general norms regarding social groups come under challenge, some individual judgments 
regarding group members will retain greater force than others.  My view is that Nguyen’s holding can be 
explained not only because the Court applied greater deference to Congressional action in light of the 
citizenship benefit that was at issue or because the Court intended to cut back on the expansive equal 
protection reading in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), but also because norms regarding 
procreation and childbirth have greater sticking power than other sex-related norms.  I develop this 
argument at length in a forthcoming article.   
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illustrates a willingness to engage in overt norm-based adjudication in a way that does not 
take place when norms are perceived by the Court to be unsettled.    
The accretion phenomenon is not limited to classifications that are ultimately 
subjected to heightened scrutiny.  Among sexual orientation cases, for example, we can 
explain the relationship among Bowers v. Hardwick,126 Romer v. Evans,127 and Lawrence 
v. Texas128 through this lens.  In all three cases, the baseline question was whether 
anything about homosexuality justified the state’s limitation of gay people’s rights.  In 
Bowers, the Court treated social norms condemning homosexuality as sufficiently settled 
so that they could be stated, without more, as the justification for Georgia’s sodomy 
law.129 Then in Romer, as discussed earlier, the Court focused on the lack of factual 
support for Colorado’s anti-gay ban and struck down the measure without mentioning the 
Bowers-approved norm regarding gay people.130 Romer then served as the fact-based, 
norm-avoidant precursor for Lawrence’s outright rejection of the moral disapproval 
norm.131 
Of course, a host of other explanations could account for the different 
adjudicative approaches of Romer and Lawrence, including the different doctrinal 
foundations of the two decisions, with Romer focused on equal protection and Lawrence 
 
126 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
127 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
128 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
129 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (relying on “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”).  The near-universal condemnation of Bowers 
suggested that the Court had miscalculated (or deliberately misrepresented) the degree to which social 
norms regarding homosexuality were contested when it glibly asserted the moral disapproval rationale and 
brushed off Michael Hardwick’s privacy claim as “at best, facetious.”  Id. at 194.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 576-75 (citing criticism of Bowers). 
130 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
131 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (“This case raises . . . whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral 
disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not 
heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an 
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”).  Cf. 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:  Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1281-83 (2004) (analyzing the Lawrence majority’s limited engagement with the 
moral disapproval rationale).   
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on due process.132 The moral disapproval rationale was also the leading justification 
proffered in Lawrence while several others had been advanced more prominently in 
Romer.133 And, certainly, the outlier status of the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law as 
only one of a handful of such laws in the nation134 made the normative declaration 
relatively safe in Lawrence. But none of these factors fully explain why the Romer 
majority did not touch the moral norm advanced so forcefully by the dissent and why 
Lawrence ultimately did.  The inclination toward norm avoidance when the normative 
waters appear to courts to be unsettled, I would argue, provides at least some of that 
explanation.   
C.  The Non-Neutrality of Fact-Based Decision-Making   
Judicial responses to norm contests are not monolithic; not always are courts 
provoked into norm avoidance simply because a settled norm has been contested.  This 
section sets out a model for identifying the conditions under which norm contestation 
might affect adjudication135 and offers a preliminary critique of the claim that sustaining 
the status quo enables courts to remain neutral in cultural conflicts.  I return to this point 
in greater depth in Part VI’s consideration of the value of candor in adjudication.   
Most of the time, norms are so deeply integrated into society that they are unseen 
and, if seen, are understood to reflect indisputable judgments about certain aspects of 
 
132 Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-35 (invalidating the Colorado amendment on equal protection 
grounds), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that “the case should be resolved by determining whether 
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution”). 
133 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73 (analyzing morals-based government interest); Romer 517 U.S. at 
632-36 (addressing government interests related to associational freedom and scarce resources).     
134 Lawrence, 539. U.S. at 573 (stating that only four states at that time had sodomy laws targeted only at 
sexual conduct of same-sex couples). 
135 The framework is not intended to suggest that all norms move through all stages or that the occurrence 
of a shift is necessarily desirable from the standpoint of the social group in question.   
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social group members’ identity and conduct.136 In this state, norms might be said to be at 
room temperature.  The Nguyen majority’s declaration that it was “unremarkable” to 
equate women’s role in childbirth and child care is illustrative.137 In this naturalized 
state, norms can go virtually unnoticed as they create links between empirical facts (men 
cannot give birth) and laws limiting social group members’ rights (fathers must take more 
steps than mothers to have citizenship conferred on their children even if they are present 
at birth).   
Even in the most homogeneous communities, however, norms rarely receive 
universal ratification.  Outlier groups or individuals not only defy but also seek to abolish 
or reformulate prevailing norms, invoking constitutional “principles in their own search 
for greater freedom.”138 We might think of Myra Bradwell’s challenge to Illinois’s 
attorney licensing rule or Carrie Bell’s challenge to Virginia’s sterilization rule in this 
way.   
Yet these challenges tend to have little effect on adjudicators.  Courts either see 
no contest or find that contestation too peripheral to have gained traction, and proceed as 
though nothing has occurred to destabilize the traditionally accepted facts and norms.  
Take, for example, the challenges to marriage laws brought by lesbian and gay couples in 
the 1970s and 1980s.139 At that time, movements for gay liberation and gay rights had 
 
136 Much critical legal scholarship has concentrated on exposing the way norms blend into what is 
perceived as natural.  A significant body of feminist literature, for example, has concentrated on exposing 
the male bias in many naturalized norms.  See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and 
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1985) (explaining the way in which “the subordination in 
gender inequality[] is made invisible; dissent from it becomes inaudible as well as rare”).  Separately, a 
growing body of law and economics literature has focused on harnessing the power of naturalized norms 
toward efficient or socially beneficial ends.  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).  
137 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 66 (2001). 
138 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
139 See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1972) (rejecting challenge to marriage law’s 
exclusion of gay couples); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (same); Singer v. Hara, 
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (same); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) (same). 
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made substantial headway in disrupting the view of gay people as mentally ill140 and 
some progress toward dispelling the belief that gay people were inherently inferior to 
heterosexuals, as evidenced by the passage of anti-discrimination ordinances prohibiting 
sexual orientation discrimination.141 Yet not even a tremor of these norm changes 
received recognition from any court asked to decide whether state marriage laws 
discriminated unlawfully against same-sex couples.  Instead, these marriage challenges 
were the proverbial easy cases, with arguments dismissed out of hand.142 
Some norm contests move past this relatively settled stage and tip into the 
mainstream.143 Yet even at this stage, when norm contests become so prominent that 
they cannot credibly be ignored, courts typically avoid taking responsibility for their 
selection among norms.  Instead, their opinions tend either to mention a norm contest as a 
reason for affirming the status quo or to justify rejection of the traditionally accepted 
view by characterizing the norm contest as having passed.  While Part IV will theorize 
various motivations for this judicial norm avoidance, the point here is simply that leaving 
norms unmentioned does not leave the public debate over norms unaffected.    
Judicial opinions addressing gay couples’ challenges to marriage laws are often 
framed in this norm-avoidant way.  The argument in these cases, like in the similar 
 
140 See infra note 164 (describing removal of homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973).    
141 See LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 5-6 
(1998). 
142 As Mahatma Gandhi observed with respect to social change efforts, “First they ignore you, then they 
laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.”  At this early contestation stage, courts could be described 
as ignoring plaintiffs’ claims. 
143 Precisely when challenges to settled norms move from margin to center is, of course, difficult to 
identify with precision, as the determination depends on which evidence of contestation, empirical or 
otherwise, is valued.  See infra text accompanying notes 176-188 (discussing conflicting perspectives of 
majority and dissenting opinions on the status of norms regarding the juvenile death penalty).  Further, to 
be clear, even after a tipping point has been reached, contestation does not disappear entirely.  Instead, the 
reference to a tipping point suggests that a once-natural norm has begun to lose its dominance among the 
general public.  In addition, the movement of views regarding social groups through various stages of 
contestation is not meant to imply that emergent norms are always preferable to traditionally held views.     
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lawsuits of the 1970s and 1980s, maintains that changed views of gay people have 
undermined the rationales traditionally accepted to sustain sexual-orientation 
discrimination.  The claim, in other words, asks courts to select among competing social 
norms.  Yet regardless of whether courts uphold or strike down the male-female 
eligibility rule for marriage, they are unanimous in recasting their role as norm selector 
and positioning themselves, instead, as following rather than leading the public debate.144 
At one end of the spectrum, for example, while recognizing that “[g]reat strides 
have already been made in protecting same-sex partners in New Jersey,” a New Jersey 
court wrote that “difficult social issues,” “vital debate, and delicate political negotiations” 
required it to sustain “the traditional understanding of marriage” and reject the plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.145 The Arizona Court of 
 
144 Courts in these cases also deploy references to norm contestation when analyzing fundamental rights 
claims by same-sex couples.  See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), 
rev. denied (2004) (“Although same-sex relationships are more open and have garnered greater societal 
acceptance in recent years, same-sex marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal and social history of 
our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”).  Because analysis of 
fundamental rights claims tends to be backward looking, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the 
Constitution:  A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161 (1988), only minimal focus is placed on the contemporary validity of the traditional norm that is my 
focus here.   
 Notably, whether courts affirm or reject the status quo, they take care in these cases to express 
respect for the sincerity of the views held by those whose position they reject, perhaps as a legitimacy-
preserving device consistent with their invocation of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (“[T]he 
court is sympathetic to the interests of the plaintiffs . . . .”), aff’d 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“This Court’s personal view [is] that 
children raised by same-sex couples enjoy benefits possibly different, but equal, to those raised by 
opposite-sex couples . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) 
(“Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to 
the union of one man and one woman . . . .”); Anderson v. King Cty., No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 
1738447, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (“The social issue before the Court [same-sex marriage] is 
one about which people of the highest intellect, the deepest morality and the broadest public vision 
maintain divergent opinions, strongly held in good faith and all worthy of great respect.”). 
145 Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at **25-26. See also id. at *25 (“[T]he Legislature and the courts have 
taken significant steps to protect the rights of same-sex couples.”).  The court went so far as to catalogue an 
extensive series of judicial decisions and statutes providing extensive legal protection for and recognition 
of same-sex couples.  See id. at **25-26. See also id. at *23 (“Social change of the type sought by 
plaintiffs is properly accomplished in the legislative arena.”); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 866 
(Sup. Ct., Tompkins County 2005) (“The decision to extend any or all of the benefits associated with 
marriage is a task for the Legislature, not the courts.  Social perceptions of same-sex civil contracts may 
change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters 
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Appeals likewise concluded that “although many traditional views of homosexuality have 
been recast over time,” the court should leave to “the people of Arizona, through their 
elected representatives . . . to decide whether to permit same-sex marriages.”146 
At the other end, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed as “a 
destructive stereotype” the traditional view “that same-sex relationships are inherently 
unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.”147 In 
light of this norm shift, rationales once accepted to justify different marriage rules for gay 
people now must be understood to reflect impermissible “prejudices against persons who 
are . . . homosexual,” the court wrote.148 With the problem framed in this way, the court 
then fulfilled its duty as the “last instance” protector of constitutional rights and rejected 
the discriminatory marriage rule.149 One of several New York Supreme Court rulings on 
the state’s marriage law likewise treated the norm contest regarding the legal significance 
of sexual orientation differences as essentially over.150 It then characterized its 
invalidation of the state’s different-sex requirement for marriage not as staking out new 
normative territory but instead as harmonizing with norms already settled by related 
jurisprudence and positive law in New York.  Its decision, the court wrote, was 
 
is the best.”) aff’d, 2006 WL 346463 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 
270, 277 (Sup. Ct., Rockland County 2004) (“It is the Legislature that is the appropriate body to engage in 
the studied debate that must necessarily precede the formulation of social policy with respect to same-sex 
marriage and the decision to extend any or all rights and benefits associated with marriage to same-sex 
couples, and, in turn, the amendment or expansion of the laws presently governing the institution of 
marriage in New York.”). 
146 Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 465. 
147 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (footnote omitted).  See also id. 
at 968 (finding that no rational basis existed to justify the state’s sex-based marriage restriction and that 
“the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are . . . homosexual”). 
 The court also repudiated a normative preference for heterosexual relationships that may have led 
other courts, albeit not overtly, to treat marriage recognition as more sacred, and therefore less subject to 
compliance with the equal protection guarantee, than other forms of state action.  “Recognizing the right of 
an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex 
marriage,” the court wrote.  Id. at 965.   
148 Id. at 968. 
149 Id. at 966. 
150 Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005), rev’d, Hernandez v. Robles, 805 
N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005). 
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“consistent with the evolving public policy as demonstrated in recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeals and other New York courts, and actions taken by the State Legislature, 
the executive branch and local governments.”151 
Under either framing of the norm, however, courts do not effectively absent 
themselves from the public debate.  Choosing the “old” norm over the “new” out of 
ostensible deference to the countermajoritarian difficulty neutralizes neither a court’s 
decision-making agency nor the decision’s role in strengthening the one norm over the 
other.  In the marriage cases, judicial affirmations of normative preferences for 
heterosexual couples, even if not articulated explicitly, reinforce the legitimacy of that 
traditional norm.  They supply legislators with reasons to block marriage rights for same-
sex couples and provide opponents of same-sex couples’ marriages with additional 
ballast for their claims that marriage by same-sex couples is not legitimate.  To the extent 
the trajectory of other legislative (and jurisprudential) change is toward rejecting sexual 
orientation-based distinctions, a decision affirming the traditional norm derails or at least 
dampens that process.  Indeed, where legislative and public policy shifts eliminated 
longstanding legal burdens on lesbians and gay men, including by rejecting distinctions 
between gay and non-gay parents, courts affirming the traditional negative norm in the 
marriage context conceivably could be accused of disrupting or disrespecting the 
 
151 Id. at 607.  Two other state supreme court justices disagreed, finding the contest to be sufficiently live 
that the issue of equal marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples required legislative, not judicial, 
intervention.  See supra note 145. 
A California Superior Court also looked to the norms reflected in extant state law, including a 
state law providing “marriage-like rights,” to find that no legitimate purpose could justify excluding same-
sex couples from marriage.   
California’s enactment of rights for same-sex couples belies any argument that the State 
would have a legitimate interest in denying marriage in order to preclude same-sex 
couples from acquiring some marital right that might somehow be inappropriate for them 
to have.  . . . [T]he State’s position that California has granted marriage-like rights to 
same-sex couples points to the conclusion that there is no rational basis in denying them 
the rites of marriage as well. 
In re Coordination Proceeding, Marriage Cases, Tentative Ruling, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *4 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005). 
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democratic process.152 
Because both affirmation and rejection of tradition requires selection among 
competing norms, the gloss of neutrality often attributed to judicial support for the status 
quo is, in short, a legal fiction much like the concept of fact-based adjudication.   So too 
is the charge that decisions rejecting traditional norms are “activist” in making normative 
judgments while those that embrace tradition have, by being passive, kept themselves out 
of the business of norm selection.  Consequently, to the extent concerns about a 
democracy deficit can be raised legitimately in connection with courts that are deciding 
cases in the midst of norm contests, those concerns have bite where courts affirm 
traditional norms as well as when courts affirm the displacement of traditional rationales 
with new norms.   
 
IV. The Role of Social Science and Social Movements 
 in a Jurisprudence of Fact-Based Decision-Making 
 
Three observations regarding the relationship of social science and social 
movements to the transformation of facts and norms flow from the operation of fact-
based decision-making described above.153 
152 By the same token, courts that reject the traditional norm and harmonize marriage law with more recent 
developments that reject sexual orientation-based distinctions also are making a contestable normative 
judgment regarding the relevance of sexual orientation to marriage.  There is no question that these courts 
have an effect on the public debate.  What interests me here, however, is why courts that affirm tradition 
are not also perceived to be making contestable, influential norm selections.    
153 For extended discussion of the relationship between courts and social science, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE 
LAW (2004); Rachel Pine, Speculation and Reality:  The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of 
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PENN. L. REV. 655 (1988); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).  
 On the relationship between courts and social movements, see, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 4; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based 
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the 
Door:  Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, 
Text in Context:  Gender and the Constitution From a Social Movement Perspective, 150 PA. L. REV. 297 
(2001). 
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 First, social science research can destabilize traditional perceptions of group 
members’ capacity by exposing and discrediting norms embedded in “factual” 
characterizations of groups.  Most classically, courts invoke social science for this 
purpose by relying on a particular fact as “proof” to justify the outcome of a case, as in 
the Labor Department studies cited in Taylor v. Louisiana to support invalidation of an 
automatic jury service exemption for women.154 
Dissenters and scholars regularly criticize this form of reliance on facts as 
selective or acontextual, yet these criticisms have comparatively little effect so long as 
the data are basically credible and the fiction remains in place that facts alone can 
determine reasonableness.155 Thus, while literature aimed at showing courts how to work 
with social science more productively may be useful to the extent it assists adjudicators in 
sifting through and thinking critically about information sources, it is unlikely to 
overcome the effects of the operation of fact-based adjudication, which enables courts to 
rely on data without acknowledging the normative and methodological choices reflected 
in the data selection and analysis.  Further, as numerous scholars have noted, more or 
“better” information does not necessarily lead people to change their views.156 
A separate, potentially more effective function of social science in adjudication is 
to identify and explain how bias has shaped perceptions of group members’ status and 
capacity.  In this respect, social science can destabilize normative facts about a social 
group by revealing how misplaced normative judgments have distorted popular 
 
154 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) 
155 See infra notes 179-188 and accompanying text (discussing critiques posed by dissenters in Roper v. 
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), regarding the process by 
which the majority moved from fact to constitutional judgment without acknowledgment of the norms that 
shaped the interpretation of evidence).    
 156 See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype:  Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
438 (1999) (“When asked to evaluate conflicting empirical studies, subjects credit those that confirm their 
prior beliefs and dismiss those that conflict with them.”). 
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“facts.”157 Heuristic devices of cognitive psychology may be useful in showing, for 
example, that a widely accepted fact about a social group rests on faulty premises 
because researchers anchored themselves at an arbitrary starting point or ignored 
fundamentally conflicting facts.158 In connection with the same-sex marriage example 
developed earlier, cognitive psychology may add value to the analysis of the claims that 
heterosexual parents are preferable for children by raising questions about biased 
anchoring, cognitive dissonance in the evaluation of research data, and other 
methodological flaws.159  The California Supreme Court, in striking down the state’s ban 
on interracial marriage, similarly deployed social science analysis, as well as 
epidemiological data, to enhance its argument that earlier, flawed factual perceptions 
regarding the significance of racial differences had been shaped by false normative 
presumptions.160 
Second, social movements likewise may heighten awareness of the dissonance 
between traditional views of a social group and contemporary perceptions.161 Unlike 
 
157 Of course, the direct effect of any social scientific analyses of fact on adjudication is limited largely to 
what litigators bring to courts’ attention.  Often, this information comes to courts through amicus curiae 
briefs filed by professional organizations such as the American Psychological Association.  See, e.g., Brief 
Amicus Curiae of the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the 
National Association of Social Workers, et al., filed in Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941 (Mass. 2003) (on file with the author). 
 Questions have been raised separately regarding the utility of cognitive psychology related, more 
broadly, to issues of institutional design.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring 
Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias:  A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616 (2002). 
158 See, e.g., David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind:  Social Influence, Fads, and Informational 
Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ieruli eds., 
1995) (explaining biased anchoring, cascade effects, and other phenomena). 
 Social science also may serve as a check on factual perceptions held by the general public as well 
as other researchers.  Its potential revelatory benefit separately motivates arguments in the employment 
discrimination context that decision-makers’ biases are often not apparent.  See, e.g., Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  
159 See, e.g., Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 82 (discussing and critiquing studies); see also Stephen A. 
Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
537 (2004-05). 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 94-99, discussing Perez.
161 The suggestion here that some perceptions are more accurate than others is offered with the awareness 
that the concept of accuracy itself is temporally contingent. 
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social science research, which can enter the courtroom as evidence, albeit in a limited 
fashion, the work of social movements is confined largely to extra-litigation activities.162 
Yet it warrants attention because the analytic framework advanced here helps clarify the 
movements’ particular influence on adjudication.   
Very broadly speaking, identity-based social movements aim to alter what they 
view as unfair perceptions of, and unjust laws imposed on, the group they represent.163 
Disruption of “facts” embodying negative normative judgments about group members is 
a first task of these movements.  With negative normative facts about a social group in 
place, law reform in the name of equality is virtually impossible because the facts 
themselves justify ill treatment of group members.  For example, one of the first efforts 
of the contemporary gay movement was to challenge the American Psychiatric 
Association’s listing of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder in Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.164 Absent that change, most challenges to 
government action distinguishing between gay and non-people would have been destined 
 
162 Some social movements also have highly sophisticated legal organizations that participate directly in 
the litigation process on group members’ behalf.   See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE 
ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1999); JACK 
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1995).  My focus here is not on gauging the efficacy of legal intervention in 
achieving movement goals but rather on identifying with specificity the particular ways in which the work 
of social movements may shape judicial responses to claims of societal change.  For discussion of the 
efficacy of social movements in achieving social justice goals of various constituencies,  see, e.g., RICHARD 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991); Brown-Nagin, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 153. 
163 For an extensive discussion of the effects of identity-based social movements on law reform, see 
Eskridge, supra note 153; Siegel, supra note 153.  
164 See Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 L. & 
SEXUALITY 1, 26-27 (2003) (describing “the elimination of diagnosis” of homosexuality as a mental 
disorder as “a necessary step to secure equal rights for gay men and lesbians”); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating 
for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1582-83 (1993) (“[T]he most 
successful challenge by these new activists was the assault mounted against the American Psychiatric 
Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders. . . . Because the medical 
profession’s definitions of illness can have meaningful legal consequences, this victory within the 
American Psychiatric Association was equivalent to winning an important test case in the courts.”) 
(footnote omitted); Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections of Psychological 
Conceptions of Homosexuality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 495, 541 (stating that “[t]he elimination of the stigma of 
mental disease has had a significant influence” on “recognizing the legal rights of homosexuals”). 
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to lose because the “fact” of mental illness could justify innumerable restrictions on gay 
people’s lives.  Similarly, the “fact” that whites were more competent both physically and 
intellectually than African Americans had to be destabilized, as did the “fact” of women’s 
and men’s natural aptitude differences, before equality claims could be adjudicated 
meaningfully.   
In the current social climate, the assertion that gay people are less suitable role 
models for children than non-gay people presents a similar challenge.  To the extent the 
assertion is treated as “fact,” it follows logically that governments can restrict gay people 
from adopting or from marrying (if marriage is treated as the state’s preferred foundation 
for childrearing).  While social scientists undertake studies, social movement leaders 
undertake public education campaigns and media outreach efforts and pursue a host of 
other strategies for raising awareness of the lives of gay people in general and gay parents 
in particular.165 As with the mental illness delisting, efforts at law reform in this area can 
be successful only if the negative “facts” about gay parents are denaturalized and 
discredited.    
Yet, as a third point regarding the influence of extrajudicial sources, discrediting 
perceived facts about a group is not always sufficient to eradicate legal burdens on group 
members.  While changes to perceptions of group members’ capacity may help change 
normative attitudes as well, this kind of synergistic transformation is not automatic.  In 
some instances, negative norms are so deeply rooted that they influence adjudication of 
social change-based claims even after negative facts about group members are no longer 
believable.  Courts in these cases let empirical, uncontested facts about group members 
stand in silently for norms that justify continuing limitations on group members’ rights in 
 
165 See, e.g., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (John D’Emilio et. Al. 
eds., 2000). 
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the way that “thick” facts had done before.  The “fact” that gay people are less able 
parents may no longer be credible to justify the exclusion of gay people from 
parenting,166 for example, but the empirical fact of procreative capacity continues to stand 
in to preserve the operation of the traditional disapproving norm.167 For as long as 
procreative capacity is seen to justify a preference for heterosexuality, courts will find the 
marriage exclusion justified. 
In this scenario, neither social movements nor social scientists are likely to have a 
direct effect on disrupting patterns of negative treatment of social group members.  
Because the norm goes unmentioned rather than being advanced explicitly as a decisive 
“fact,” it is a more elusive target than normative-factual assertions about group members.  
Further, even to the extent the norm’s operation could be isolated, the norm—as norm—
is offered as a social judgment, not a fact.  As such, it is not subject to disproof in the way 
that facts are; rational, evidentiary-based arguments by definition will not be as effective.    
Consequently, social movements are relatively helpless in challenging norms that 
silently justify continued burdens on group members after facts supporting those burdens 
have been disproved.   For similar reasons, social science is most effective at attacking 
fact-based perceptions of social groups and far less effective at destabilizing negative 
norms that persist in the wake of discredited facts.  While both have some ability to 
 
166 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (“The father’s continuous exposure of the child 
to his immoral and illicit relationship [with another man] renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a 
matter of law.”); Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. 1986) (“It is inconceivable that 
[the children] could go into that environment [where the father lived with his male partner], be exposed to 
this relationship and not suffer some emotional disturbance, perhaps severe.”) (citation omitted).  
167 This reliance on empirical rather than questionable normative facts is also evident in litigation strategy.  
For example, in defending New York’s exclusionary marriage law, the City of New York offered 
procreation as a justification for the law’s classification yet, at the same time, disavowed the position of 
disapproving gay people as parents.  As shown earlier, since procreative capacity alone cannot explain the 
law’s different treatment of gay and non-gay people, it is difficult to understand the procreation argument 
as linked to anything other than a preference for heterosexuals as parents.  Yet, for political or other 
reasons, the City apparently felt it could not embrace that position.  Consequently, it proffered the empirical 
facts of procreation to do its unspoken normative work.  Appellant’s Brief at 45, Hernandez v. Robles, No. 
103434/2004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t filed June 27, 2005). 
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disrupt the norms associated with uncontested facts about group members, the diffuse 
operation of those norms and their lesser susceptibility to rational argument renders the 
effect of those efforts far less predictable.  Thus, challenges to the norms associated with 
empirical facts may be understood best as a second-order task of social movements or 
social scientists, for these attacks can begin to gain traction only if normative facts are 
displaced first.   
 
V.  Theorizing Judicial Norm Avoidance 
This Part considers the pragmatic and theoretical conditions that lead courts to 
respond to social change as a factual phenomenon before recognizing changes to norms.  
It looks, in other words, at why the pressure for constitutional tipping on issues related to 
social groups is located in perceptions of facts about group members rather than in 
perceptions of evolving norms.   
Legal process theories, with their focus on courts’ limited capacity to gather 
information related to changing social norms and on their tenuous legitimacy relative to 
majoritarian bodies, offer one frame for understanding the judicial response to social 
change claims.168 Result-oriented legal realist theories offer another, with their claim that 
opinions are best understood as improvisations of a court aimed to obscure or legitimate 
 
168 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (explaining that, under legal process theory, “the 
particular task of courts . . . is to decide cases on the basis of reasoned argument, and only issues that can 
be resolved by that approach are appropriate for judicial resolution.  When courts go beyond this role, they 
endanger their legitimacy as legal institutions—first, because they assert an unjustifiable claim to political 
superiority, and second, because they act beyond their area of competence.”); see also G. Edward White, 
The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 PENN. L. REV. 1212, 1247-49 (1976) (discussing development of 
legal process theory).   
 Critiques of the legal process paradigm have spawned more elaborate and nuanced analysis of the 
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches.  See, e.g., Rubin, supra; Michael C. Dorf, Legal 
Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 895-96, 925-35 (2003).  
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an outcome that is largely unrelated to the stated reasoning.169 Socio-psychological 
theories suggest that all human beings, including judges, process change first through 
factual perceptions and can see normative shifts only later.  The discussion below 
evaluates and refines the application of these theories in the context of social change-
based claims and advances, in addition, a theory suggesting that fact-based adjudication 
preserves institutional interests in maximizing flexibility in decision-making.  Remaining 
questions regarding the legitimacy of fact-based analysis relative to other approaches to 
adjudication will be taken up in Part VI.   
A.  Legal Process Justifications for Fact-Based Adjudication:  The Influence 
of Concerns With Judicial Legitimacy and Institutional Capacity 
 
If we assume, arguendo, that courts approach adjudication with genuine concern 
for their legitimacy (either in the eyes of the general public or their elite peers) and with 
recognition of their limited capacity, their preference for fact-based decision-making 
appears to be a sensible, conservative, reputation-protecting strategy for several reasons.  
First, the very project of identifying norms (and changes to those norms) has an 
intangible, almost anthropological quality to it as compared to the project of fact 
identification.  Because a norm signifies a societal judgment, determining a norm’s 
contours requires delving into the inner life of a community, a task for which courts are 
notoriously ill-suited from a legal process perspective.170 Not surprisingly, then, when 
courts talk about norms, they typically transform the inquiry from an abstract gauging of 
 
169 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); 
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1993).  Not 
all of these statements are critical of the underlying judgment.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 91, at 430 
(offering alternate explanation for result reached in Brown).   
170 Justice Scalia made much of this judicial capacity issue in his Roper dissent.  See Roper v. Simmons, 
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1222 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See infra text accompanying notes 182-184. 
 The rise of juries could be said to reinforce this point, to the extent that juries are understood to 
bring into the judicial process a more accurate sense of community norms than judges might bring to bear.  
On the other hand, the decline of juries might be read to suggest that courts have become more adept at 
assessing norms.  See generally WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001). 
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social sensibilities to a fact-finding project based on legislation, judicial opinions, and, on 
occasion, polling data and reports from expert organizations.  Absent consensus on the 
meaning of this information, however, the difficult normative choices inherent in 
declaring norms are inescapable and, often, not easily defended.  Although deciding 
which data are credible as an empirical matter requires only thin agreement, determining 
which empirical “evidence” should be included (e.g. do opinion polls count?) and how 
best to interpret whatever evidence makes the cut is not automatic.  Declaring norms thus 
leaves courts vulnerable to accusations that they have mistaken their own views for those 
of the majority.   
Sifting among facts and treating selected facts as decisive does not fully escape 
these sorts of problems.  Still, fact-based decision-making enables courts to take account 
of societal change while maintaining the appearance, superficially at least, of being less 
subject to manipulation based on the preferences of individual adjudicators.  In part, this 
is because the norms for which those facts stand in typically remain unmentioned.  
Moreover, facts are relatively more obvious, more measurable, and more subject to proof 
than norms.  If the observable evidence belies the normative fact that children of 
interracial couples are incapable of reproducing, for example, that reproductive “fact” 
will be destabilized and a court will have to embrace that change or risk its credibility as 
a fact-finder.171 Concerns with legitimacy thus prevent courts from retaining a picture of 
 
171 A recent case assessing the scope of maritime jurisdiction, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. 385 
(2004), illustrates this point in a different context.  At issue was whether maritime jurisdiction would 
encompass the “‘new era’” of technological change in cargo container transportation.  Id. at 394 (internal 
citation omitted).   
While it may once have seemed natural to think that only contracts embodying 
commercial obligations between the “tackles” (i.e., from port to port) have maritime 
objectives, the shore is now an artificial place to draw a line.  Maritime commerce has 
evolved along with the nature of transportation and is often inseparable from some land-
based obligations.   
Id. at 394.  We might guess at the nature of the norms that enabled the Court to move from one vision of 
maritime jurisdiction to another—perhaps it was a commitment to realism over formalism or a Swift v. 
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a social group substantially different from the one that is known broadly, even if that 
picture is a longstanding one and the subject of the “new” facts is unpopular in the 
surrounding society.172 
The difficulty for a court in declaring norms, as opposed to facts, is well 
illustrated by two recent death penalty cases, in which the majority’s measure of this 
country’s “evolving standards of decency”—i.e., social norms—was hotly contested. 173 
As these cases show, while agreement could be reached relatively easily regarding the 
content of “thin” facts that reflected popular views about the permissibility of the death 
penalty’s application to people with mental retardation or juveniles—i.e., the “objective 
indicia of consensus” such as “the enactments of legislatures,”174 determination of those 
 
Tyson-like judgment that the nation would benefit from broadening the reach of federal law in this area.  
For our purposes here, though, the specific norm or norms that guided understandings of the fact of the 
changed technology is unimportant; what matters is that, to the Court, the norms did not require mention as 
part of its decision to abandon one set of facts for another.   
172 This observation may have only limited value outside the context of facts related to social groups.  For 
example, many of the facts on which evidence law is based have been shown to be incorrect, yet the law’s 
dissonance with reality continues to be tolerated relatively easily.  See, e.g., Bryan A. Lang, Shortcuts to 
“Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 259 (1998) (observing 
that “none of the considerations” that support the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule “rest on 
any relevant empirical evidence or study of the matter”).  However, factually inaccurate assumptions of 
evidence law are far less likely to be known by the general public, and, therefore, less likely to raise doubts 
about judicial capacity than similarly incorrect characterizations of social groups.    
In addition, if a community remained invested deeply in a traditional normative fact, a court would 
not necessarily be compelled to embrace the “new” knowledge even if it persuasively destabilized the old 
“fact.”  In this respect, courts have discretion either to embrace change, which they can do credibly by 
highlighting empirical evidence that discredits the old fact, or ignore “new” evidence and embrace the fact 
that is popular in the surrounding community.  Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), might be said to 
reflect the latter option.  In sustaining Virginia’s antimiscegenation law, the Virginia Supreme Court 
acknowledged the California Supreme Court’s observation in Perez that interracial marriage “could not be 
considered vitally detrimental to public health and morals.”  Id. at 753 (citing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 
17, 31 (Cal. 1948)).  It rejected that view, however, and embraced instead the fact that interracial marriage 
would produce a “mongrel breed of citizens,” linking its validation of Virginia’s antimiscegenation law to 
historical fact:  “[H]istory teach[es] that nations and races have better advanced in human progress when 
they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture and developed their own peculiar genius.”  
Id. at 756. 
173 Eighth Amendment doctrine commands the Court to identify the social norms, in the form of decency 
standards, against which particular applications of the death penalty must be weighed.  See Roper, 125 S. 
Ct. at 1190 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); see also id. at 1191 (discussing “[t]he 
inquiry into our society’s evolving standards of decency”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) 
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (same). 
174 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.  The Court has described this statutory source as “[t]he clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).  
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facts’ social meaning was anything but uncomplicated.175 
In Roper v. Simmons, most recently, the majority found that “objective indicia” 
demonstrated “national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles”176 based on, 
inter alia, state legislatures’ abolition of the juvenile death penalty, “the infrequency of 
[the penalty’s] use even where it remain[ed] on the books; and the consistency in the 
trend toward abolition of the practice.”177 The Court found, too, that social science 
evidence of juveniles’ “diminished culpability” relative to adults reinforced this 
position.178 
According to Justice O’Connor’s dissent, however, the same facts “fail[ed] to 
demonstrate conclusively that any [genuine national] consensus has emerged” in the 
“brief period” since the Court sustained the juvenile death penalty in 1989.179 She 
characterized the pace of change as “halting,”180 and found the majority’s analysis 
regarding the culpability of juvenile offenders to “def[y] common sense.”181 Justice 
Scalia, also dissenting, declared the majority’s identification of norm change based on 
changed empirical facts to be “implausible,”182 especially given “the fact that a number of 
legislatures and voters have expressly affirmed their support for capital punishment of 
 
Disagreement, unrelated to the point here, exists as to whether and to what extent judges should consider 
their own judgment as well.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s view 
that “[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the 
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eight Amendment.”) (internal punctuation 
omitted) (emphasis in original). 
175 For example, norms, not facts, would dictate whether evidence of differences in decision-making 
capacity of people with mental retardation and juveniles should be accorded legal salience.  Further, norms 
would determine whether and how information about international norms should be factored into the 
analysis.    
176 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1192. These indicia, the Court found, “provide sufficient evidence that today 
our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”  Id. at 1194 
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). 
177 Id. at 1194. 
178 Id. at 1196. 
179 Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). 
180 Id. at 1211. 
181 Id. at 1214. 
182 Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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16- and 17-year old offenders” since the Court’s earlier ruling on the issue.183 He, like 
Justice O’Connor, accused the Court of giving meaning to empirical facts based on 
personal preferences:  “[A]ll the court has done today . . . is to look over the heads of the 
crowd and pick out its friends.”184 
A similar split erupted in Atkins v. Virginia.185 For the Atkins majority, the 
“consensus reflected in [the] deliberations” of “the American public, legislators, scholars, 
and judges” was against imposition of the death penalty on people with mental 
retardation.186 Justice Scalia, in dissent, declared the majority’s identification of a norm 
based on those sources to be “empty talk,”187 and charged that the majority had relied on 
its “feelings and intuition” to give meaning to these facts.188 
The sharp dispute over how to glean norms from facts highlights the amorphous, 
contestable nature of norms relative to facts.  This difference means not only that courts 
are particularly vulnerable in declaring norms but also that, conceptually, facts are easier 
to discredit than norms.  Norms, as judgments, are simply not subject to the same kinds 
of testing and verification as facts, whether those facts are “thick” or “thin.”  As a result, 
demonstrating a court’s flawed reliance on an outdated norm is difficult, at best.  Not 
surprisingly, then, courts experience more pressure to reject discredited facts (which will 
typically be “thick” facts, as “thin” facts are less likely to undergo change) and to steer 
clear of overtly selecting among contested norms wherever possible.   
 
183 Id. at 1220. 
184 Id. at 1223. See also Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11 
(criticizing the majority’s conclusion that international norms almost universally oppose application of the 
death penalty to juveniles).  
185 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
186 Id. at 316, 307.  The Court also pointed to social science evidence to conclude that people with mental 
retardation have diminished culpability.  Id. at 318-19 & nn. 23 & 24. (“Their deficiencies . . . diminish 
their personal culpability.”). 
187 Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
188 Id. (emphasis in original).  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, focused criticism on the majority’s 
reliance on “international opinion, the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls 
not demonstrated to be reliable.”  Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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In addition to the relatively high exposure of facts and the relative difficulty of 
discerning norms, risks related to judicial legitimacy incentivize courts to focus on facts 
and avoid evaluating norms.  Should a court affirm a norm as a justification for 
government’s limiting a social group’s rights, it could appear to be inappropriately 
substituting categorical acceptance of majoritarian preferences for its own judicial 
review.  If, on the other hand, a court rejects the dominant norm, it might appear to be 
substituting its own normative views for those of the people, a disfavored 
countermajoritarian move.  In this light, fact-based decision-making appears to offer a 
convenient escape from these two undesirable options. 
This institutional constraint-based theory seems, on its face, to provide a neat 
explanation for fact-based decision-making—courts are likely to be less vulnerable to 
criticism of overstepping if they make decisions based on relatively uncontested facts and 
avoid staking out positions among competing norms.  On the other hand, however, fact-
based adjudication has not protected courts from controversy regarding the limits of 
judicial power.  It is hard to imagine that the criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
interventions in contested social arenas as in Brown, Romer, and Grutter would have 
been significantly different had the Court been more open about the normative 
underpinnings of its decisions.  To the extent the public pays attention to the Supreme 
Court’s actions, it reacts to holdings, not reasoning.189 Likewise, the focus on facts has 
not prevented academics and lawyers, as well as peers in the judiciary, from identifying 
and criticizing decisions’ normative underpinnings and implications either in scholarly 
publications, trade publications or dissenting opinions.   
189 John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High Regard, 77 JUDICATURE 
273 (1994), cited in Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 
2028-30 (2002).   
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Even if fact-based decision-making is dubious as a strategy for preserving judicial 
legitimacy, the difficulties associated with norm identification arguably trigger real 
concerns regarding institutional capacity that could explain courts’ orientation toward 
fact-based decision making.  Yet this argument is also less than fully convincing—there 
is no admission in the Eighth Amendment cases, for example, that norms of decency are 
difficult to identify.  Even the dissents in Roper and Atkins, which excoriate the 
majority’s norm identification, do not suggest that discerning norms from facts is difficult 
but only that the majority erred in doing so.  Further, there is no shortage of cases in 
which courts declare norms and treat them as decisive, as shown above.190 The judicial 
dynamic by which fact-based decisions precede norm declarations illustrates a preference 
for delaying the normative analysis but not for avoiding it altogether.  There is nothing in 
the cases, in other words, suggesting that courts sense themselves to be fundamentally 
constrained from identifying norms because of capacity limitations.  
B.  Legal Realist Explanations for Fact-Based Adjudication 
Perhaps fact-based decision-making should be seen as without significance, then, 
beyond its function to mask judges’ penchant for manipulating the adjudication process 
to reach preferred results.  After all, to the extent that fact-based decisions are more 
defensible than norm declarations for the reasons discussed above, they provide better 
cover for judges’ underlying interests in outcome.  On the other hand, though, the cover-
up theory is inadequate for the same reasons the legitimacy and capacity arguments are 
not fully satisfactory.  To the extent the public pays attention to judicial action, it is 
looking to outcomes, not opinions.  The legal elite likewise suspects ideological 
 
190 See supra Part II.  
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motivation on the part of many judges.191 Deployment of careful rhetoric does not 
alleviate that concern and, in fact, may heighten criticism of judicial dishonesty.   
This is not to suggest that either institutional constraints or results-orientation 
have no effect on adjudicators.  Surely it is true that, at times, fact-based decisions will be 
less likely to trigger criticism, or at least less likely to trigger as much criticism—either 
from the public or the bar—than overtly normative decisions.  But given that neither 
theory fully resolves our inquiry, several others warrant consideration. 
C.  Implications of Social Psychology and Cognitive Science for 
Understanding Judicial Responses to Social Change 
 
Quite possibly, the judicial reaction to changing views of social groups simply 
mirrors the way in which the broader public experiences those changes.  That is, while 
norms inevitably inform attitudes about the status and capacity of group members, they 
are often not consciously experienced, particularly as those attitudes begin to change.  
Instead, a previously disdained group comes to be seen as more capable than previously 
thought based on group members’ workforce participation, artistic accomplishments, or 
other activities.  Only later does the normative overlay of the earlier-held views regarding 
group members become apparent.  In this light, fact-based intervention neither reflects 
institutional constraints nor masks result-orientation but instead reflects the way in which 
human beings, including judges, change their views about social groups.192 
This theory, which can also be taken as a description of how norms move from a 
naturalized to a destabilized state,193 goes some way toward explaining how courts can 
rely on facts to reject previously accepted norms regarding social group members’ rights 
 
191 See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); A BADLY 
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002).  
192 See generally Krieger, supra note 158; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
193 See supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text. 
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and leave unacknowledged the normative shift implicated by their changed position.  
This helps explain, too, some of the ways in which courts seem genuinely unaware of the 
normative underpinnings of their decisions, as in the seemingly authentic disbelief of the 
majority in Nguyen at being called sexist by the dissent.194 
But the “nature of social change” theory, by itself, is also insufficient.  Even if the 
Nguyen majority could not see that women’s role in childbirth could not automatically 
explain the sex-based immigration rule, surely the Court in Brown and Romer, among 
other cases, was well aware of those decisions’ normative dimensions and was quite 
deliberate in not acknowledging them.  What else then, beyond institutional constraints 
and the desire for rhetorical cover, might explain the strategic use of facts to intervene in 
norm contests regarding social groups? 
A related theory would explain fact-based adjudication not solely as an 
unconscious method of adaptation to change but rather as reflecting a preference for fact 
comparisons as involving a simpler psychological task than norm analysis.  Because they 
tend to be observable or measurable, facts are relatively easy to compare and contrast.  
Norms, on the other hand, because of their amorphous, if not ineffable, nature, are less 
than ideal comparators.  On this view, the difficulty lies not only in the limited abilities of 
courts qua courts to identify norms as opposed to facts but also with the capacity of 
human beings to compare facts as opposed to norms.  Indeed, that litigation proceeds 
 
194 Although one could argue that the majority was willfully ignoring the dissent’s point, I read the 
majority’s response as failing to join issue with the dissent’s claim of sex-based bias because it simply does 
not grasp or find credible the dissent’s point.  Cf. Anthony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot:  Unconscious 
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 202 (2005) (“[L]earned patterns prove 
remarkably resistant to change. Once the unconscious has detected an initial correlation, a person will 
continue to behave as though the correlation exists long after it has disappeared.  In many situations, the 
person will even behave as though the correlation has strengthened, even in the presence of contradictory 
information.  This self-perpetuation of the correlation occurs unconsciously, so that a person’s behavior is 
the appropriate measure of the correlation’s strength; a person cannot consciously articulate the reasons for 
his behavior.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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largely as a process of mobilizing facts may be evidence of this theory’s force.  
Moreover, even if norms can be identified, reaching agreement on the proper 
characterization of a norm (as opposed to a fact) can be daunting.  Was the underlying 
norm regarding the social group of African Americans as it affected the analysis in 
Brown particular to differences between African Americans and whites or was it a 
commitment to the irrelevance of racial differences more broadly?  To the extent the 
norm shift concerned views of African Americans specifically, was the move toward a 
view that African Americans and whites were on an equal footing as human beings or 
that differences between African Americans and whites existed but were not legally 
cognizable?  As we know, individual justices held differing views on these and related 
questions.195 When we try to understand why the Court avoided a norm declaration in 
Brown, for example, we can imagine that the underlying norm for some members of the 
Court would  Judges that might agree on outcome may have great difficulty cohering 
around a specific normative underpinning for that result.  This might be thought of as the 
“getting to yes” strand of the socio-psychological theory of fact-based adjudication.  If it 
is relatively easy for judges to reach agreement on fact statements and near-impossible to 
agree upon a precise norm, the judicial inclination toward fact-based decisions becomes 
all the more understandable.   
D.  Fact-Based Adjudication in the Service of Institutional Interests:   
 A Methodology That Preserves Judicial Flexibility 
 
A further reason that courts may avoid declaring changes to social norms relates 
more to institutional interests in preserving flexibility than to institutional constraints on 
the way judicial power is exercised.  Courts that frame a decision as rejecting a norm 
rather than as responding to a fact (or a fact change) risk committing themselves to a 
 
195 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 657-99 (1976). 
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broad doctrinal position that limits room to maneuver in later cases.  A court might want 
to reject a norm in one context, for example, but might not want to risk embracing 
rejection of that norm in similar settings.  By avoiding all discussion of the norm, the risk 
of a stare decisis roadblock is averted or at least minimized.196 
A counterfactual may help test this.  In Reed v. Reed,197 as discussed above, the 
Court never addressed the normative fact of “natural differences” between men and 
women that the Idaho Supreme Court held justified the subordination of wives to 
husbands in estate administration.  What if, instead of ignoring the Idaho court’s 
rationale, the U.S. Supreme Court had unraveled norm from fact and rejected the natural 
domesticity norm as impermissible?  In addition to the risk of being charged with 
inappropriately and ineptly intervening in a cultural debate, the Court potentially would 
have disabled use of “natural” sex differences to justify government action in other cases.  
This is a position the Court was, and remains, unwilling to take.198 Rejecting the 
traditional judgment about women’s natural inclinations, in other words, would have 
gone too far doctrinally, in addition to the myriad legal process-type problems it might 
have generated.   
Perhaps, then, the court could have limited its rejection of “natural differences” to 
the context at issue.  Instead of focusing on the empirical justification’s inadequacy, the 
court might have held that judgments about “natural sex differences” did not support sex-
based estate administration rules.  But recognizing the norm shift even in this narrow way 
would have been riskier than the Court’s empirically-focused analysis because the 
 
196 The literature on judicial minimalism illustrates the existence of this approach, see, e.g., Sunstein, supra 
note 25, but does not explore the particular incentives courts have to make minimalist decisions in the 
context considered here.     
197 404 U.S. 71 (1971).   
198 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 
U.S. 464 (1981). 
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concession of normative change begs the questions whether any sex-based distinction in 
treatment could be justified by “natural” differences and, if so, how?199 By not 
acknowledging its rejection of the norm, the court enabled itself and lower courts to 
sidestep more easily the resurfacing of “natural” differences in other cases.  
Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent, highlighted the ways in which 
explicit rejection of norms about social groups constrains future decision-making.  There, 
he castigated the majority and the concurrence for assuming they could reject the norm of 
gay people’s immorality as a rationale for Texas’s Homosexual Conduct Law but then 
accept the same norm to justify sexual orientation-based distinctions in the military or 
marriage.200 “This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one 
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this 
Court,” he wrote.201 
One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather 
than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to 
their logical conclusion.  The people may feel that their disapprobation of 
homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual marriage, 
but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts—and may 
legislate accordingly.  The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar 
 
199 While the way in which a court articulates its standard for reviewing certain classifications also can be 
more or less constraining (i.e., a norm of skepticism via heightened scrutiny will be more limiting to future 
decision-making than a norm that social group-based distinctions can survive if they are reasonable), my 
focus here is on whether courts constrain themselves by the way they evaluate government interests, 
whatever the applicable standard of review.  As we have seen, whether under heightened or rational basis 
review, the Court has tended toward fact-based decisions whenever a particular normative judgment about 
a social group appeared to be in contest and, even under the highest levels of review, government reliance 
on the protected trait sometimes is sustained.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  Further, for 
example, as Justice Scalia pointed out, infra text at notes 200-202, the explicit rejection of the moral 
disapproval norm in Lawrence will make it far more difficult for the Court to resuscitate that norm to 
sustain a sexual orientation-based distinction in a future case, notwithstanding that rational basis review 
may be applied.  While we may see efforts to cabin Lawrence and reassert acceptance of the moral 
disapproval norm, my guess is that we are more likely to see decisions relying either on other normative 
judgments about gay people or on fact-based distinctions, such as those related to the procreative capacity 
of same- and different-sex couples.  The recent opinions by state courts in marriage cases bear this out, 
with morality left largely unmentioned while procreative facts and normative support for tradition serving 
as widely accepted justifications.  See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text and infra notes 218-219 
and accompanying text.         
200 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).    
201 Id. at 605. 
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freedom of action[.]202 
In contrast to majoritarian bodies, which can pick and choose among norms, courts, as 
Justice Scalia suggested, have significantly less flexibility.  Once a general norm has 
been rejected in one context, it is difficult, at best, to resuscitate that norm in a related 
case.   
In some respects, this institutional interests theory accounts most broadly for fact-
based adjudication of social change claims.  Its explanatory value does not depend on 
courts being conscious of the normative positions implicated by their opinions; courts 
making fact-based decisions might either be unsure of how to articulate the normative 
shift or, conceivably, unaware of the normative position their opinions reflect, as in cases 
where norms remain deeply naturalized.  The interest in minimizing restrictions on future 
exercises of judicial power likewise serves interests of outcome-oriented judges as much 
as it serves those who perceive themselves as constrained by judicial capacity and 
legitimacy concerns.   
The operation of fact-based adjudication and the institutional interests theory that 
helps explain the judicial preference for facts over norms thus adds a new layer to our 
understanding of judicial review.  Typically, legal process, legal realist, and cognitive 
psychological approaches to adjudication are seen as having little in common.  To the 
extent they are all operationalized via fact-based adjudication, however, their shared 
instinct toward preservation of future decision-making authority becomes legible.   
The institutional interests theory has several potential weaknesses that bear 
consideration.  For one, it fails to explain why courts would ever declare norms if to do 
so is power-restricting.  One also could argue, in a different vein, that norm declarations 
 
202 Id. at 604. 
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are not as restrictive of future exercises of judicial power as the theory suggests.  The 
Supreme Court has regularly rejected a normative preference for equality, for example, 
on the grounds that the facts require a different analysis.203 Conversely, one could argue 
that fact-based decision-making are power-limiting more than power-preserving because 
they can be read more narrowly than norm declarations. 
As to the first  point, we might resuscitate the theory by distilling its essence, 
which is confirmed by the descriptive analysis above — that although courts may reach a 
point of comfort with norm declarations, the judicial instinct upon entering new 
normative terrain is to drop a relatively light anchor that allows for ease of movement in 
the future.  Only later, once the terrain is better know through the accretion of fact-based 
decisions, is greater security regarding the selected position likely to arise.  At that point, 
but not before, courts may find sufficient comfort to drop the heavier anchor in the form 
of stating the underlying norm.   
The fact that some limited future drifting may occur in the form of decisions that 
reject application of the declared norm to a given case does not diminish the generally 
constraining effects of norm-declarative cases, which must be distinguished on the 
grounds that the principle does not carry over to the new facts.  Fact-based decisions, on 
the hand, can be distinguished without reference either to principle or norm, leaving far 
more room for courts to maneuver in the future.   
While the engendering of greater room for maneuver certainly can be read as 
reflecting an inclination to limit rather than preserve power, as the third objection 
suggests, I believe the power-preservative reading is more accurate in the context of 
social group cases.  The reason, drawing from the descriptive discussion above, is that 
 
203 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (distinguishing restrictions 
on gay people in marriage and the military from restrictions related to sexual intimacy).   
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fact-based decisions have the effect of enshrining or endorsing a particular norm 
regarding a social group but without the concomitant pressure to defend or reconcile the 
retention of traditional views in one case with the rejection of similar views in another.  
In other words, while fact-based decisions might appear to be narrower, that appearance 
rests on the fiction that judicial decisions do not embody normative judgments and have 
no effect on the popular norm debate.      
 
VI.  The Legitimacy of Fact-Based Adjudication:  Would Candor Be Better? 
With the above description and theory of fact-based adjudication in mind, this 
final section considers whether greater candor regarding the normative judgments 
implicated in adjudication would be preferable to the current focus on facts.  What would 
be gained – and lost – by consistent exposure of the normative positions regarding social 
groups in constitutional adjudication?   
In the literature on judicial candor, several general positions have been staked out.  
At one end is the argument that candor is always, or almost always, preferable.  From this 
perspective, obscuring the “real” reason for decisions is disagreeable as a matter of 
general principle and potentially dangerous to the stability and credibility of courts if 
accepted as a matter of institutional design.204 On the other end is the argument that 
candor, in the sense of introspection by judges regarding the genuine reasons for their 
 
204 See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 251-52 (1964) (describing 
“a reputation for candor” as the Supreme Court’s “precious political asset”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND (1930); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 
(1995); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); David L. 
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) [hereinafter Shapiro, Judicial 
Candor]; Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721 (1979). Cf. CALABRESI,
supra note 8 (advocating candor but acknowledging that judges experience different constraints than 
scholars); Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism:  Models of Adjudication and the Duty to 
Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 155-60 (2006) (discussing literature on judicial candor within broader analysis of 
courts’ adjudicative responsibilities).   
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decisions, actually might harm the judicial process by weakening judges’ internalized 
sense of obligation to follow rules rather than exercise unconstrained discretion.205 In 
between are pragmatic, instrumental arguments suggesting that political and other 
constraints render candor, even if desirable, an unrealistic aim.206 
Before assessing the potential value of increased candor in connection with social 
group litigation, two preliminary points require attention. First, I assume that even if 
norms cannot be described as precisely as facts, it is possible, in virtually all cases, to 
articulate some aspect of the governing norm.  Indeed, given the frequent efforts in 
dissenting opinions to expose and criticize the norms allegedly ignored by the majority, 
the hurdle of norm identification does not seem insuperable as a practical matter, even if 
it is a difficult task for reasons addressed above.207 
The second concerns the meaning of candor.  Although the literature defines 
candor in multiple ways, a consistent thread is a focus on “the declarant’s state of 
mind.”208 Much of the literature deems a candor requirement to be satisfied if a judge 
does not intend to deceive others; self-deception is treated as a separate issue.209 For 
purposes here, I take a view of candor that extends beyond avoidance of deliberate 
deception and includes an expectation that courts identify and articulate the normative 
underpinnings of their decisions.  Through this approach, I mean to reach cases in which 
 
205 See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Candor of 
Justice Marshall, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 83 (1989); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist:  
Statues and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 249-57 (1983).  But see Gail Heriot, Way 
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1991) (critiquing Altman’s arguments).   
206 See Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 204, at 742. 
207 See supra Part V.C. 
208 Id. at 732. 
209 See Altman, supra note 205, at 297 (suggesting a distinction between candid, meaning “never being 
consciously duplicitous” and introspective, meaning “critically examining one’s mental states to avoid any 
self-deception or error”); Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 204, at 732 (excluding self-deception from 
an analysis of the value of judicial candor).  Earlier literature, such as that of the legal realists, treated the 
two as more closely aligned.  See Altman, supra note 205, at 297-98 (“The realists urged judges to 
recognize and to disclose the motivations that the judges deny . . . .”). 
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norms are deeply naturalized and seen as inseparable from fact, as in decisions based on 
the “natural” ordering of race or sex, as well as decisions in which courts deliberately 
avoid addressing norms.  In this way, I can test more fully the consequences of displacing 
the fact-based adjudication fiction with a more transparent approach to decision-making 
in social group cases. 
What might be gained, then, from increased pressure on courts to acknowledge 
expressly the normative grounds for their opinions in social change cases?  Leaving aside 
general moral preferences for honesty,210 several possible benefits come to mind.  First, 
we might conclude that greater transparency regarding decisions’ normative 
underpinnings would pressure courts to account for dissonant positions regarding a social 
group rather sidestep stare decisis constraints by sweeping inconsistencies under a factual 
cover.  Under this approach, we would expect to see decisions that are more fully 
theorized.   
Second, it might be that, if forced to expose their normative positions, some 
courts would decide cases differently.  Greater transparency, in other words, might 
function as a partial limit to judges’ otherwise relatively unconstrained exercise of result-
oriented preferences.  Of course, one can always argue that courts will offer what they 
perceive to be “acceptable” norms to justify decisions that are actually driven by 
“unacceptable” motives.  But in some cases, the task of drumming up a passable norm to 
justify burdening a particular social group may be either too difficult or not worth the risk 
to judicial credibility.  For example, as suggested earlier, had the Court in Nguyen been 
pressured to identify the norm that linked the empirical fact of childbirth to a rule that 
presumed women were more likely to nurture their children than men, it might have 
 
210 Cf. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1978).  
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hesitated to take that strongly contested position.  
Third, we might conclude that greater openness regarding normative motivation 
would be desirable from the vantage point of social change advocates.  Even if litigation 
resulted in losses for a social group, the justificatory rationales would have to be stated 
clearly in contrast to the current practice, which permits empirical facts to stand in for 
negative norms even after these norms have been discredited as resting on inaccurate 
assumptions about group members.  The clarity that would flow from a candor 
requirement might enable future challenges to be more focused and, potentially, more 
successful.     
On the other hand, several consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments 
call attention to the double-edged nature of transparency and suggest that candor may not 
be desirable, either practically or theoretically.  Social movements, for example, are in a 
relatively stronger position to debunk erroneous traditional facts about group members 
than to disprove norms, as discussed earlier, since norms are not falsifiable in the way 
that facts typically are.211 Social science analysis likewise can be deployed against 
factual mischaracterizations of groups but is far less effective in challenging norms.  
Thus, if decisions turn on facts rather than norms, advocates for social change have 
greater opportunity to offer definitive, or at least more powerful, critiques than if 
decisions turn overtly on norms.212 
In addition, as noted above, reaching consensus on the specifics of a governing 
norm regarding a social group whose status is in flux may not be possible either because 
of substantive or rhetorical disagreement regarding the characterization of the norm.  
 
211 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
212 An additional risk for advocates of social change is that a court’s explicit identification and approval of 
a negative norm about group members will reify and strengthen the norm to a greater extent than a decision 
that affirms the norm implicitly. 
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Consequently, a court poised to rule for a social group in a fact-based decision that elides 
these difficulties might opt to sustain the status quo if norm identification is required.  
While most social movements would likely prefer decisions that overtly reject negative 
norms about the group, those same movements will typically prefer victory to outright 
loss, even if the victory takes the narrower form of a fact-based ruling.   
Further, and perhaps more importantly from an institutional design standpoint, 
fact-based decisions may, through their lack of overt norm declaration, encourage 
extrajudicial conversation among other governmental institutions and the general public 
regarding norm selection and revision.  Judicial declarations, by contrast, are likely to 
limit the scope of future legislative activity213 and the effectiveness of social science and 
social movements on the public’s views of social groups.   
Simply put, norm declaration closes doors more definitively than norm avoidance.  
Much like common law decisions are more easily adjustable than constitutional 
decisions, even though those also are not fixed absolutely, fact-based decisions allow 
greater room for future movement than norm-based decisions.  In this way, when making 
fact-based decisions, particularly in contested normative arenas, courts leave open the 
possibility that norms will emerge with greater clarity from other, more representative 
bodies.   
Related to this point is the idea that, as a society, our commitment to pluralism 
extends to pluralism about norms.214 From this vantage point, a certain amount of 
 
213 Judicial affirmation of a traditional norm raises political risks for a majoritarian legislature that is 
inclined to reject that norm.  Advocates for the traditional norm will be strengthened in their claim that the 
legislature has acted based on personal preferences rather than to reflect the majority’s will.  Likewise, 
legislative rejection of a traditional norm may spark legal challenges and sharpen public criticism by 
adherents of the traditional norm.   
214 See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 1466 (describing American democracy as “pluralist in 
character” and observing that “responses to racial discrimination in the United States reflect a strong 
commitment to the idea of pluralism”); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American 
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muddiness related to norms reflects not only the instrumental difficulty with norm 
identification but also the normative desirability of preserving and encouraging diverse 
perspectives on social groups and most other topics.  Pressure for normative clarity, even 
in adjudication, thus would run contrary to overarching political and jurisprudential 
commitments.   
While these arguments against an outright candor requirement are generally 
persuasive for the reasons just discussed, they are also incomplete.215 Even if the fiction 
that courts can avoid making normative judgments warrants acceptance most of the time, 
it appears to be exploited to excess on occasion in ways the arguments fail to justify.  My 
specific concern is with decisions that depend on the fiction not only avoid identifying 
their normative underpinnings but also to avoid acknowledging and addressing 
connections among cases involving related norms.  This is not to say that the norm shift 
in case 1 must also occur in case 2 involving the same social group but rather that, if the 
norm shift is refused in case 2, that determination should be defended overtly.    
Of course, insisting on acknowledgment and distinction of decisions resting on 
conflicting norms could give rise to the same problems for social groups seeking change 
discussed above.  In particular, pressure on courts to address overtly differing views 
regarding a social group might lead courts to affirm traditional norms in all instances 
rather than enabling a patchwork of positions.  Alternately, if a judge remains willing to 
risk the appearance of inconsistency and reject traditional norms in some settings but 
 
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 373 n.529 (1992) (linking 
“America’s vibrant cultural pluralism” to “core principles of representative government”). 
215 The position impels important questions about whether adjudication that avoids full disclosure and 
defense of underlying normative choices should ever be tolerated and, further, about the scope and extent 
of candor that should be expected of judges that are sensitive to the role of norms in their decision-making.  
In the interests of focusing on the problem at hand, I will set aside the broadest iterations of these questions 
and concentrate here on their application in the context of claims that courts should integrate societal 
change. 
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accept them in others, overt affirmation of a traditional norm, even if limited to a 
particular context, could breathe new life into a restrictive view of social group members’ 
capacity in a way that a fact-based elision would not.   
Moreover, the task of articulating the normative (as opposed to factual) reasons 
why a social group can be treated equally in one setting yet unequally in another simply 
may be too difficult a task for courts for all of the reasons discussed above regarding the 
challenges of norm identification.  Further, even if courts are competent enough to do 
this, the requirement may be so unrelated to the actual way in which judges adjudicate 
difficult social group cases as to have little effect on the actual decision-making process.  
If a judge relies on Karl Llewellyn’s situation sense216 to distinguish one setting from 
another, for example, rather than a more intellectually rigorous analytic process, 
insistence on engagement with conflict norms may alter the text of a decision but not the 
underlying reasoning.   
Several of the other reasons advanced above to support fact-based adjudication 
have less traction with respect to acknowledgment of divergent norms, however.  The 
embrace of pluralism would not, at least in theory, be hindered by the expectation that 
reliance on differing views regarding the same social group be addressed expressly.  To 
the contrary, the overt defense of pluralistic viewpoints regarding a social group could be 
seen as reflecting and fostering broader commitments to diversity.  Further, to the extent 
 
216 That sense, although not defined specifically in Llewellyn’s own work, has been well described as a 
“‘process of thinking’ that considers ‘the implications of various legal rules, matched up against 
reasonably intricate models of social situations, and brought together in light of the force of all the claims 
to be made.”  Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation  An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 129, 293 n.573 (2003) 
(emphasis supplied), quoting Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts  Of “Default Rules” and 
“Situation Sense,” in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW at 191, 214 (Jack Beatson & Daniel 
Friedmann, eds., 1995).  On Llewellyn’s situation sense, see also Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 307, 393 n.374 (2005); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
842, 842-46 (1999).  For an extensive critique, see Hanson & Yosifon, supra, at 293-99. 
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courts recognize the validity of competing viewpoints regarding a group, even if in 
different contexts, room remains for the public and its representatives to continue to 
debate the relative merits of each position in extrajudicial settings.  
 Because the marriage cases with which this article began illustrate so strikingly 
the fiction’s effect of enabling disregard of competing norms, I return to them now to 
revisit the operation of fact-based adjudication and to consider the consequences of 
limiting that adjudicative fiction in the ways just discussed.  In the majority of these 
cases, courts have rejected the claims of lesbians and gay men seeking to marry.  Most 
often, as discussed earlier, they hold that marriage is reserved justifiably for different-sex 
couples because those couples can, in theory if not reality, procreate without third party 
assistance.  Courts often characterize the rationale as reflecting the essence of marriage 
rather than as expressing a view about the social group of gay people.  When the 
procreation rationale is set against the background of marriage case law, however, it 
becomes clear that the law of marriage does not now, and has never, treated procreation 
as essential.217 
Why, then, has procreative capacity emerged as the definitive factual justification 
for excluding same-sex couples from marriage?  Most of the cases do not offer anything 
other than a glib reference to history and/or to traditional views of marriage.218 One court 
 
217 Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1089 (2002).  Certainly today, economic interdependence is widely acknowledged as the primary function 
of civil marriage.  Civil marriage has always been an economic relationship between the spouses, although 
during coverture, the relationship was less about interdependence than about wives’ legal status merging 
into that of their husbands.  Emotional interdependence and childrearing are occasionally recognized as 
important as well, though far more in the public discourse than in domestic relations jurisprudence.  
Procreation, on the other hand, has been specifically disavowed as a marital requirement, as indicated by 
the law delineating eligibility for marriage, annulment law, and the constitutional protection for a woman’s 
right, even absent her husband’s consent, to terminate a pregnancy.   Neither is procreation limited by law 
to marriage.  Id.   
218 On history and tradition as justifications for government action, see, e.g., Rebecca Brown, Tradition 
and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of 
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has gone further to suggest that marriage is necessary to impose order on heterosexual 
procreation, something not needed for same-sex couples whose procreation is necessarily 
more deliberate.219 
Yet it is somewhat difficult to take seriously, in light of common sense as well as 
the legislative framework and case law concerning marriage, the suggestion that egg, 
sperm, and gestation are more fundamental to marriage than the lifetime of parenting 
responsibilities of the adult partners after childbirth.  Indeed, as the fact/norm framework 
illustrates, the facts of procreation alone are insufficient as explanations for the sex-based 
restriction in marriage law.  They are not evaluative or explanatory; a norm must give 
meaning to those facts to justify their use to exclude same-sex couples from marriage.  
This explanatory deficit is particularly striking since many same-sex couples do 
procreate—albeit with third party assistance.220 
If we are to understand what is really driving the decisions, then, the exposition of 
the fact-based adjudication model above challenges us to identify the norms for which the 
biological facts of procreation stand in.  Put another way, we must ask what normative 
position a court is taking regarding lesbians and gay men as parents if it sustains different 
marriage rules for gay and non-gay people on the grounds of procreative capacity.  Most 
courts have yet to pose these questions, let alone answer them.221 Even if we accept the 
lack of candor regarding the norms that give meaning to procreation, however, we also 
 
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
219 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“What does the difference between 
‘natural’ reproduction on the one hand and assisted reproduction and adoption on the other mean for 
constitutional purposes?  It means that it impacts the State of Indiana’s clear interest in seeing that children 
are raised in stable environments.  Those persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and 
expense associated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very likely to be able to provide 
such an environment, with or without the ‘protections’ of marriage, because of the high level of financial 
and emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in the first place. 
By contrast, procreation by ‘natural’ reproduction may occur without any thought for the future.”) 
220 Of course, many different-sex couples procreate with third-party assistance as well.   
221 But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
72
must ask whether courts legitimately can disregard the numerous decisions that are not 
troubled by differences in procreative capacity when rejecting distinctions between gay 
and non-gay parents.  In most of the states in which marriage challenges have been 
adjudicated, there is ample case law holding that sexual orientation should not be taken 
into account in making custody and visitation decisions absent some showing of harm to 
the child.222 These cases embody and often express directly a normative judgment about 
the relative equality of gay and non-gay parents.  A court wishing to treat gay and non-
gay parents as normatively unequal in the marriage context potentially could still do so, 
perhaps on the ground that the cases embracing contrary norms reflect individualized 
determinations about parenting rather than broad policy judgments.223 Complete failure 
to wrestle with the dissonant normative position in these cases, however, amounts not 
only to a lack of candor but also, arguably, to a kind of duplicity through the deliberate 
disregard of related precedent.224 
Conceivably, even with strong precedent rejecting legal distinctions between gay 
and non-gay parents, courts might rest their decisions to uphold a discriminatory 
marriage law on a desire to avoid displacing the people’s representatives on a contested 
issue.  But the analysis of fact-based adjudication above should make us hesitant to 
accept this explanation.   
For one, any decision—including a decision to sustain the status quo—reflects a 
 
222 See Patricia M. Logue, The Facts of Life for Gay and Lesbian Parents, 25 FAM. ADVOC. 43, 44 (2002) 
(“The overwhelming trend in custody and visitation cases is not to attach negative presumptions about 
parenting or conduct to a parent’s sexual orientation, but to look at whether there is any evidence of harm 
to children. . . .  A clear majority of states takes this approach.  In recent years, even states generally 
considered socially conservative on issues of homosexuality and parenting have disclaimed any per-se rule 
restricting custody for lesbian or gay parents on the basis of sexual orientation alone.”). 
223 I would disagree with this distinction in that decisions on these issues announce principles to be applied 
beyond the case at bar, but will leave my disagreement at that, for now.     
224 I take this position cognizant of Karl Llewellyn’s point that a determined court can distinguish 
precedent in a variety of ways.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
(1960).  Llewellyn assumes, for the most part, that precedent will be distinguished, not ignored.  Forcing 
that exposure on a consistent basis is a check, even if an imperfect one, against judicial duplicity. 
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selection among competing norms regarding the social group of gay people, as shown 
earlier.  Second, the profession that the plaintiffs’ challenge must be rejected out of 
deference to the legislature disregards that the legislature typically has spoken to the 
issue before the court, which is the legitimacy of retaining different rules for gay and 
non-gay adults in the context of marriage.  Domestic relations law in states across the 
country makes clear, as noted earlier, that a couple’s capacity to procreate without 
assistance is neither necessary nor sufficient as a marriage qualification.   
But there is more than that.  The legislatures in most states where marriage 
litigation is taking place also have expressed normative judgments about the difference 
(or lack thereof) between gay and non-gay parents through legislative frameworks 
regarding adoption, foster care, guardianship and other mechanisms related to parenting 
and adult care for children.  If the state’s view is that gay people do not make as good 
parents as non-gay people, surely that would be reflected in the law concerning children 
who are wards of the state.225 If the state’s view is that couples capable of procreating 
without assistance make better parents than other couples, we would expect that, too, to 
be reflected in these laws.  But such prohibitions exist as outliers, if at all.226 Even 
further, courts in many of these states have authorized second-parent adoptions so that 
both parents in a same-sex couple can establish a legal relationship with the child(ren) 
they are raising.  Yet in none of these states has the legislature acted to overturn a second-
parent adoption ruling on the ground that same-sex couples should not be encouraged to 
 
225 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(sustaining Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbian and gay adults), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). For a critique of the 11th Circuit’s decision in Lofton,
see, e.g., Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit:  On Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of 
Children, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421 (2005). 
 We might also expect to see prohibitions on gay adults serving as role models for children, 
whether as teachers, coaches or leaders of youth organizations yet no state has in place anything of the 
kind. 
226 See Strasser, supra note 225. 
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parent.   
In this context, the risk for social group advocates that pressure for overt 
acknowledgment of competing norms would cause courts to hew to traditional norms in 
all other cases involving that group does not seem great.  Given the near-universality of 
the trend toward removing sexual orientation-based distinction in all areas other than the 
military and marriage, a re-articulation of the traditional norm would be unlikely to spark 
a reversal.  On the other hand, it might dampen ongoing legislative efforts to make 
marriage available to same-sex couples by reinforcing traditional hostility toward or 
deprecation of gay people in ways that a fact-based resting on the purported link between 
procreation and marriage would not.     
More broadly, one might object that the federalist system does and should allow 
precisely this sort of state-by-state experimentation and that pressure on courts to defend 
the acceptance of competing norms would cut against this value.  Federal equal 
protection law should not prohibit states from embracing divergent public policies, this 
argument would urge.  The question here, however, is not whether experimentation in the 
abstract is permissible or desirable.  Instead, it is whether the justification on which a 
state relies for its burdensome treatment of the targeted social group has become 
impermissible in light of social change, even if the state’s law reflects experimentalist 
instincts.  Through this lens, judicial review that takes account of societal changes to 
normative views of social groups even could be characterized as state-respecting, in that 
its cues regarding the continued legitimacy of these views come from the activities of the 
states themselves.   
The requirement that conflicting norms be exposed and defended should be even 
less controversial with respect to state constitutional analysis, given that the restriction on 
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a social group could be measured against other treatments of that group intrastate.227 
Again, the candor requirement would not mandate a coherent set of norms regarding a 
group but rather a legitimate explanation for the continued use of the rights-restricting 
norm in some settings but not others. 
Justice Scalia would object, as he did in his Lawrence dissent, that by looking to 
norms reflected in legislation as well as in judicial precedent, courts would impose an 
unduly burdensome requirement that legislatures act on consistent principles rather than 
moving incrementally.228 But this concern is not as grave as it might appear.  The 
argument here is not that courts invalidate legislation unless it is in lockstep with 
principles reflected in similar laws.229 Indeed, such a proposal would be futile given that 
legislatures typically do not work so coherently, and that laws often reflect a diversity of 
norms regarding social groups.230 Also, courts retain the authority to decide whether and 
how far to carry a norm from one context to another.  Relating one context to another has 
long been the essence of judicial practice.  The point instead is that the advantage of 
flexibility has substantial costs and that those costs warrant consideration as we evaluate 
the acceptability of fact-based adjudication.   
Another objection to a framework requiring acknowledgment of conflicting 
norms would be that it inappropriately pressures courts to impose their own views across 
 
227 See Kaye, supra note 9, at 16 (recognizing that state courts’ “use of the common law to define rights at 
times has been preferable in that it has allowed both courts and legislatures room to adapt principles to 
changed circumstances” and observing that federal courts lack “that same flexibility” because of their 
limited powers to create common law). 
228 See supra text accompanying notes 200-202.  
229 Indeed, courts need not look to legislation at all.  While legislation, like case law, may provide useful 
insight into the settling of norms that are related directly to the rationale being considered by a court, the 
candor requirement conceivably could be limited to case law.   
230 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 129 (1971) (“I’m 
skeptical that a method of forcing articulation of purposes [by legislatures] can be developed that will be 
both workable and helpful.”); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222, 233-
35 (1976) (arguing that the natural of the lawmaking process renders legislative intent difficult to discern).   
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all decision-making rather than exercising discretion to leave change in hotly contested 
areas to the legislature.  The argument would maintain that even if the court has affirmed 
non-traditional views of the targeted social group in other settings, courts should 
minimize their role on issues that are central to public debate.  While this point has plenty 
of political force, it too rests on a misconception about the relationship between courts 
and legislatures.  Because legislation tends to respond more quickly to societal change 
than common law or constitutional law, “new” views regarding social groups ordinarily 
will be reflected in statutes well before courts begin adjudicating constitutional claims.  
Indeed, if all other sexual orientation-based distinctions have been removed from statutes 
and case law, their retention in marriage law arguably has occurred because it is not 
politically tenable for the legislature to clean up the last vestiges of longstanding hostility 
toward the social group at issue.231 Affirming traditional disapproval for gay parents, 
therefore, is not a neutral move but instead runs counter to other legislative expression on 
the same issue.  From this perspective, courts seem particularly well-suited, as enforcers 
of equal protection and other constitutional guarantees, to identify the occurrence of 
process failure and correct its consequences.   
Of course, it is also possible that the exclusionary law’s survival in the face of 
other changes demonstrates not that process failure has occurred but rather than the 
interaction of marriage and same-sex couples is somehow different from all other law 
related to sexual orientation.  But if that is the claim, it ought to be defended.  To the 
extent the contemporary approach of fact-based adjudication safeguards courts from that 
 
231 See ELY, supra note 230.  Consider, for example, the refusal of some legislatures to repeal sodomy 
prohibitions even after judicial invalidation.  See, e.g., Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Note, Liberta Revisited: 
A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 857, 894 (1996) (noting that “in 1980, the New York Court of Appeals declared [New York’s law 
criminalizing non-commercial sexual conduct between consenting adults] unconstitutional as a violation of 
the right to privacy in People v. Onofre. To date, the statute remains on the books.”) (citation omitted). 
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pressure to defend, it presents not merely a pragmatic mode of analysis but also a cover 
for result-oriented decision-making that should be removed.  
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Wherever one comes out on the ultimate question of how much account courts 
should take of societal change, the constant involvement of courts in assessing social 
norms cannot reasonably be ignored.  Courts evaluate and select among competing norms 
related to the status and capacity of social groups on a regular basis, even when those 
norms are contested and even when their normative choices go unacknowledged.  
Consequently, the presumption made by many courts, elected officials and commentators 
that courts avoid influencing norm contests when they reject social change-based claims 
is misconceived.  It is the fiction of fact-based adjudication, not a unique aptitude of 
courts to make decisions without normative choices, that enables judgments to be made 
without mention of norms.  Our theories of judicial review will be better off, both with 
respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the extent they embrace, rather than 
overlook, this reality. 
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